Rampling A, Wiseman S, Davis L, Hyett A P, Walbridge A N, Payne G C, Cornaby A J
Public Health Laboratory, Pathology Department, Dorset County Hospital, Williams Avenue, Dorchester, DT1 2JY, UK.
J Hosp Infect. 2001 Oct;49(2):109-16. doi: 10.1053/jhin.2001.1013.
Observational and microbiological data were collected from the patients and environment of a male general surgical ward over a period of 27 months from January 1998. Isolates of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) from patients and environment were typed by antibiogram, bacteriophage and pulsed field gel electrophoresis of chromosomal DNA. In September 1999, an intervention was put in place which included increasing the domestic cleaning time by 57 hours per week, with emphasis on removal of dust by vacuum cleaning, and allocation of responsibility for the routine cleaning of shared medical equipment. From January 1998 to September 1999, despite standard infection control measures (emphasis on hand hygiene, isolation of affected patients and staggered closure and cleaning of ward bays), 69 patients acquired a strain of E-MRSA16. This strain was also widespread in the ward environment. Typing confirmed that isolates from patients and environment were indistinguishable from one another and that the outbreak was due to a single strain. This strain was responsible for postoperative infection in approximately one third of the patients who acquired it. In the six months following the intervention, only three patients were colonized with the outbreak MRSA and monthly surveys failed to detect this strain in the environment. Thorough and continuous attention to ward hygiene and removal of dust was needed, to terminate a prolonged outbreak of MRSA infection on a general surgical ward, in addition to standard infection control measures. Control of hospital-acquired infection with MRSA requires a combination of measures, none of which are completely effective in isolation.
1998年1月起的27个月内,从某男性普通外科病房的患者及环境中收集了观察数据和微生物学数据。对患者及环境中分离出的耐甲氧西林金黄色葡萄球菌(MRSA)菌株,通过抗菌谱、噬菌体分型及染色体DNA脉冲场凝胶电泳进行分型。1999年9月实施了一项干预措施,包括将日常清洁时间每周增加57小时,重点是通过吸尘清除灰尘,并分配专人负责共享医疗设备的常规清洁。1998年1月至1999年9月期间,尽管采取了标准的感染控制措施(强调手卫生、隔离感染患者以及交错关闭和清洁病房隔间),仍有69名患者感染了一株E-MRSA16。该菌株在病房环境中也广泛存在。分型结果证实,患者和环境中的分离株无法区分,且此次暴发是由单一菌株引起的。该菌株导致约三分之一感染它的患者发生术后感染。在干预措施实施后的六个月里,只有三名患者被暴发的MRSA定植,且每月的调查均未在环境中检测到该菌株。除了标准的感染控制措施外,还需要对病房卫生和灰尘清除给予彻底和持续的关注,以终止普通外科病房长期的MRSA感染暴发。控制医院获得性MRSA感染需要多种措施相结合,没有一种措施能单独完全有效。