Kendler Kenneth S
Department of Psychiatry, Medical College of Virginia of Virginia Commonwealth University, P.O. Box 980126, Richmond, VA 23298-0126, USA.
Am J Psychiatry. 2006 Jul;163(7):1138-46. doi: 10.1176/ajp.2006.163.7.1138.
Research advances in psychiatric genetics have raised expectations that genetic findings might lead to major breakthroughs in psychiatric nosology. The author reviews the plausibility of these claims. Four areas are addressed. First, it is argued that familial aggregation of a single putative psychiatric syndrome provides at best limited evidence for the validity of that syndrome. Second, both traditional and molecular genetic strategies can supply important insights into major diagnostic conundrums. However, evidence that one or a few individual genes impact on risk for two disorders is not likely to resolve definitively the nosologic relationship between the two syndromes. Third, while gene-based essentialist models for psychiatric disorders are conceptually appealing, they are not well supported empirically. Gene discovery in psychiatry is, on its own, unlikely to allow us to "carve nature at its joints," thereby validating categorical psychiatric diagnoses. Fourth, the project to ground "messy" psychiatric categories on the firm foundation of genes-as an archetypal natural kind-may be fundamentally flawed because the very concept of "the gene" as a discrete entity is itself increasingly in doubt. Whereas psychiatric genetics has and will continue to provide important insights into the etiology of psychiatric and substance use disorders, it is not likely alone to provide deep answers to the complex and multifaceted problems facing psychiatric nosology.
精神科遗传学的研究进展引发了人们的期望,即基因研究结果可能会在精神科疾病分类学上带来重大突破。作者审视了这些说法的合理性。文章探讨了四个方面。首先,有人认为单一假定精神科综合征的家族聚集现象最多只能为该综合征的有效性提供有限的证据。其次,传统和分子遗传学策略都能为主要诊断难题提供重要见解。然而,单一或少数几个基因影响两种疾病风险的证据不太可能最终解决这两种综合征之间的疾病分类学关系。第三,虽然基于基因的精神科疾病本质主义模型在概念上很有吸引力,但在实证上却缺乏有力支持。仅靠精神科领域的基因发现不太可能让我们“依自然之关节划分自然”,从而验证精神科的分类诊断。第四,将“杂乱的”精神科类别建立在基因这一典型自然类别的坚实基础上的项目可能存在根本缺陷,因为“基因”作为一个离散实体的概念本身越来越受到质疑。虽然精神科遗传学已经并将继续为精神疾病和物质使用障碍的病因提供重要见解,但仅靠它不太可能为精神科疾病分类学面临的复杂多面问题提供深刻答案。