Kareev Yaakov, Avrahami Judith
The Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.
Psychol Sci. 2007 Jul;18(7):636-41. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01951.x.
Even with ample time and opportunity to use extensive data, people often make do with small samples, which increases their risk of making the wrong decision. A theoretical analysis indicates, however, that when the decision involves continually selecting among competing, adaptive agents who are eager to be selected, an error-prone evaluation may be beneficial to the decision maker. In this case, the chance of an error can motivate competitors to exert greater effort, improving their level of performance--which is the prime concern of the decision maker. This theoretical argument was tested empirically by comparing the effects of two levels of scrutiny of performance. Results show that minimal scrutiny can indeed lead to better performance than full scrutiny, and that the effect is conditional on a bridgeable difference between the competitors. We conclude by pointing out that small-sample-based, error-prone decisions may also maintain competition and diversity in the environment.
即使有充足的时间和机会使用大量数据,人们往往还是依赖小样本,这增加了他们做出错误决策的风险。然而,一项理论分析表明,当决策涉及在急于被选中的相互竞争的适应性主体中持续进行选择时,容易出错的评估可能对决策者有益。在这种情况下,出错的可能性会促使竞争者付出更大努力,提高他们的表现水平——而这正是决策者最关心的。通过比较对表现的两种审查水平的效果,对这一理论观点进行了实证检验。结果表明,与全面审查相比,最低限度的审查确实能带来更好的表现,而且这种效果取决于竞争者之间可弥合的差异。我们最后指出,基于小样本、容易出错的决策也可能在环境中维持竞争和多样性。