University of Southern Denmark, Odense.
Public Adm. 2010;88(2):315-30. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01832.x.
A key motive for establishing the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was restoring public confidence in the wake of multiplying food scares and the BSE crisis. Scholars, however, have paid little attention to the actual political and institutional logics that shaped this new organization. This article explores the dynamics underpinning the making of EFSA. We examine the way in which learning and power shaped its organizational architecture. It is demonstrated that the lessons drawn from the past and other models converged on the need to delegate authority to an external agency, but diverged on its mandate, concretely whether or not EFSA should assume risk management responsibilities. In this situation of competitive learning, power and procedural politics conditioned the mandate granted to EFSA. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council shared a common interest in preventing the delegation of regulatory powers to an independent EU agency in food safety policy.
建立欧洲食品安全局(EFSA)的一个主要动机是在食品恐慌和疯牛病危机频发后恢复公众信心。然而,学者们对塑造这个新组织的实际政治和制度逻辑关注甚少。本文探讨了支撑 EFSA 成立的动态因素。我们考察了学习和权力塑造其组织结构的方式。有证据表明,从过去和其他模式中吸取的经验教训都集中在需要将权力委托给一个外部机构,但在其任务授权上存在分歧,具体来说,EFSA 是否应该承担风险管理责任。在这种竞争学习的情况下,权力和程序政治影响了授予 EFSA 的任务。欧盟委员会、欧洲议会和欧洲理事会在防止将监管权力委托给食品安全政策的独立欧盟机构方面有着共同的利益。