School of Humanities, Arts, and Cultural Studies, Arizona State University, 4701 W Thunderbird Road, Phoenix, AZ 85306, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2013 May;39(5):330-5. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100656.
In their paper 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argue that because there are no significant differences between a fetus and a neonate, in that neither possess sufficiently robust mental traits to qualify as persons, a neonate may be justifiably killed for any reason that also justifies abortion. To further emphasise their view that a newly born infant is more on a par with a fetus rather than a more developed baby, Giubilini and Minerva elect to call this 'after-birth abortion' rather than infanticide. In this paper, I argue that their thesis is incorrect, and that the moral permissibility of abortion does not entail the moral permissibility of 'after-birth' abortion.
在他们的论文《死后堕胎：为什么婴儿应该活着？》中，阿尔贝托·吉比利尼和弗朗西斯卡·米内尔瓦认为，由于胎儿和新生儿之间没有显著差异，两者都没有足够强大的心理特征来被认定为是人类，因此，新生儿可以因为任何与堕胎相同的理由被合法杀害。为了进一步强调他们的观点，即新生儿更类似于胎儿而不是更成熟的婴儿，吉比利尼和米内尔瓦选择将其称为“死后堕胎”而不是杀婴。在本文中，我认为他们的论点是不正确的，即堕胎的道德可允许性并不意味着“死后堕胎”的道德可允许性。
