Department of Epidemiology and Nutrition, Moi University School of Public Health, College of Health Sciences, Nandi Road, Eldoret, Kenya.
Implement Sci. 2013 May 8;8:48. doi: 10.1186/1748-5908-8-48.
In high-resource settings, 'pay-for-performance' (P4P) programs have generated interest as a potential mechanism to improve health service delivery and accountability. However, there has been little or no experimental evidence to guide the development or assess the effectiveness of P4P incentive programs in developing countries. In the developing world, P4P programs are likely to rely, at least initially, on external funding from donors. Under these circumstances, the sustainability of such programs is in doubt and needs assessment.
METHODS/DESIGN: We describe a cluster-randomized controlled trial underway in 18 health centers in western Kenya that is testing an innovative incentive strategy to improve management of an epidemiologically and economically important problem--diagnosis and treatment of malaria. The incentive scheme in this trial promotes adherence to Ministry of Health guidelines for laboratory confirmation of malaria before treatment, a priority area for the Ministry of Health. There are three important innovations that are unique to this study among those from other resource-constrained settings: the behavior being incentivized is quality of care rather than volume of service delivery; the incentives are applied at the facility-level rather than the individual level, thus benefiting facility infrastructure and performance overall; and the incentives are designed to be budget-neutral if effective.
Linking appropriate case management for malaria to financial incentives has the potential to improve patient care and reduce wastage of expensive antimalarials. In our study facilities, on average only 25% of reported malaria cases were confirmed by laboratory diagnosis prior to the intervention, and the total treatment courses of antimalarials dispensed did not correspond to the number of cases reported. This study will demonstrate whether facility rather than individual incentives are compelling enough to improve case management, and whether these incentives lead to offsetting cost-savings as a result of reduced drug consumption.
ClinicalTrials.gov Registration Number NCT01809873.
在资源丰富的环境中,“按绩效付费”(P4P)计划作为一种提高卫生服务提供和问责制的潜在机制引起了人们的兴趣。然而,几乎没有或没有实验证据来指导发展中国家 P4P 激励计划的制定或评估其有效性。在发展中世界,P4P 计划可能至少在初期依赖于捐助者的外部资金。在这种情况下,此类计划的可持续性值得怀疑,需要进行评估。
方法/设计:我们描述了正在肯尼亚西部 18 个卫生中心进行的一项集群随机对照试验,该试验正在测试一种创新的激励策略,以改善对流行病学和经济上重要的问题——疟疾诊断和治疗的管理。该试验中的激励方案促进了对卫生部关于在治疗前进行疟疾实验室确认的指导方针的遵守,这是卫生部的一个优先领域。与其他资源有限的环境中的研究相比,这项研究有三个独特的创新之处:激励的行为是医疗质量而不是服务交付量;激励措施是在机构层面实施,而不是在个人层面实施,从而使整个机构的基础设施和绩效受益;如果有效的话,激励措施的设计是预算中性的。
将适当的疟疾病例管理与财务激励措施联系起来,有可能改善患者护理并减少昂贵抗疟药物的浪费。在我们的研究设施中,平均只有 25%的报告疟疾病例在干预前通过实验室诊断得到确认,而且开出的抗疟药物总治疗疗程与报告的病例数不对应。这项研究将表明,是机构激励而不是个人激励足以改善病例管理,以及这些激励措施是否会因药物消耗减少而带来抵消成本节约。
ClinicalTrials.gov 注册号 NCT01809873。