Kahane Guy, Everett Jim A C, Earp Brian D, Farias Miguel, Savulescu Julian
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's St., Oxford OX1 1PT, UK; Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK.
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St. Ebbe's St., Oxford OX1 1PT, UK; Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, UK.
Cognition. 2015 Jan;134:193-209. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.005. Epub 2014 Nov 13.
A growing body of research has focused on so-called 'utilitarian' judgments in moral dilemmas in which participants have to choose whether to sacrifice one person in order to save the lives of a greater number. However, the relation between such 'utilitarian' judgments and genuine utilitarian impartial concern for the greater good remains unclear. Across four studies, we investigated the relationship between 'utilitarian' judgment in such sacrificial dilemmas and a range of traits, attitudes, judgments and behaviors that either reflect or reject an impartial concern for the greater good of all. In Study 1, we found that rates of 'utilitarian' judgment were associated with a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context, as well as with sub-clinical psychopathy. In Study 2, we found that 'utilitarian' judgment was associated with greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. In Studies 3 and 4, we found no association between 'utilitarian' judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit and unequivocal. This lack of association remained even when we controlled for the antisocial element in 'utilitarian' judgment. Taken together, these results suggest that there is very little relation between sacrificial judgments in the hypothetical dilemmas that dominate current research, and a genuine utilitarian approach to ethics.
越来越多的研究聚焦于道德困境中所谓的“功利主义”判断,在这些困境中,参与者必须选择是否牺牲一人以拯救更多人的生命。然而,这种“功利主义”判断与真正出于功利主义对更大利益的公正关切之间的关系仍不明确。在四项研究中,我们调查了此类牺牲困境中的“功利主义”判断与一系列特质、态度、判断和行为之间的关系,这些特质、态度、判断和行为要么反映要么拒绝了对所有人更大利益的公正关切。在研究1中,我们发现“功利主义”判断的比例与对商业背景中明显道德违规行为的一种大致不道德的看法相关,也与亚临床精神病态相关。在研究2中,我们发现“功利主义”判断与对理性利己主义的更多认可、向慈善机构捐款较少以及与作为经典功利主义核心特征的对全人类的认同感较低相关。在研究3和4中,我们发现牺牲困境中的“功利主义”判断与涉及帮助远方有需要的人、自我牺牲和公正的典型功利主义判断之间没有关联,即使这些判断的功利主义理由被明确且毫不含糊地阐述出来。即使我们控制了“功利主义”判断中的反社会因素,这种缺乏关联的情况仍然存在。综合来看,这些结果表明,当前研究中占主导地位的假设困境中的牺牲判断与真正的功利主义伦理方法之间几乎没有关系。