Bullot Nicolas J
ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, North Ryde, NSW 2109 Australia.
Biol Philos. 2015;30(3):359-382. doi: 10.1007/s10539-014-9447-x. Epub 2014 Apr 29.
To explain agent-identification behaviours, universalist theories in the biological and cognitive sciences have posited mental mechanisms thought to be universal to all humans, such as agent detection and face recognition mechanisms. These universalist theories have paid little attention to how particular sociocultural or historical contexts interact with the psychobiological processes of agent-identification. In contrast to universalist theories, contextualist theories appeal to particular historical and sociocultural contexts for explaining agent-identification. Contextualist theories tend to adopt idiographic methods aimed at recording the heterogeneity of human behaviours across history, space, and cultures. Defenders of the universalist approach tend to criticise idiographic methods because such methods can lead to relativism or may lack generality. To overcome explanatory limitations of proposals that adopt either universalist or contextualist approaches in isolation, I propose a philosophical model that integrates contributions from both traditions: the psycho-historical theory of agent-identification. This theory investigates how the tracking processes that humans use for identifying agents interact with the unique socio-historical contexts that support agent-identification practices. In integrating hypotheses about the history of agents with psychological and epistemological principles regarding agent-identification, the theory can generate novel hypotheses regarding the distinction between recognition-based, heuristic-based, and explanation-based agent-identification.
为了解释主体识别行为,生物科学和认知科学中的普遍主义理论假定了一些被认为对所有人都普遍适用的心理机制,比如主体检测和人脸识别机制。这些普遍主义理论几乎没有关注特定的社会文化或历史背景如何与主体识别的心理生物学过程相互作用。与普遍主义理论不同,情境主义理论诉诸特定的历史和社会文化背景来解释主体识别。情境主义理论倾向于采用旨在记录人类行为在历史、空间和文化方面的异质性的个案研究方法。普遍主义方法的支持者往往批评个案研究方法,因为这种方法可能导致相对主义,或者可能缺乏普遍性。为了克服单独采用普遍主义或情境主义方法所提出的观点的解释局限性,我提出了一个整合了两种传统贡献的哲学模型:主体识别的心理历史理论。该理论研究人类用于识别主体的追踪过程如何与支持主体识别实践的独特社会历史背景相互作用。在将关于主体历史的假设与关于主体识别的心理学和认识论原则相结合时,该理论可以产生关于基于识别、基于启发式和基于解释的主体识别之间区别的新假设。