Le Moal Michel, Swendsen Joël
Neurocentre Magendie, Inserm U862, Bordeaux, France; Université de Bordeaux, 146, rue Léo-Saignat, 33077 Bordeaux cedex, France.
Université de Bordeaux, 146, rue Léo-Saignat, 33077 Bordeaux cedex, France; CNRS UMR 5287, Bordeaux, France; École pratique des hautes études, Paris, France.
C R Biol. 2015 Aug-Sep;338(8-9):593-601. doi: 10.1016/j.crvi.2015.06.014. Epub 2015 Aug 4.
When examined in a long-term perspective, brain sciences demonstrate certain conceptual consistencies as well as theoretical oppositions that have lasted for centuries, ever since Ancient Greece. The neurosciences have progressed more on the basis of technological than conceptual advances, and the constant recuperation of new techniques from other sciences have led to a continually reductionist view of the brain and its functions. In a different perspective, if not opposite to the reductionism, are the psychological constructs and those that constitute the functional unity of individuals, which are still mysterious. In fact, the gap between these two approaches has never been larger than it is now. This chapter discusses the enduring nature of some of these problems and their recent consequences.
从长远角度审视,自古希腊以来,脑科学展现出了某些持续数百年的概念一致性以及理论对立。神经科学更多是基于技术而非概念进步而发展,从其他学科不断借鉴新技术导致了对大脑及其功能的持续还原论观点。与还原论不同(若不是相反的话)的是,心理建构以及构成个体功能统一性的那些因素仍然神秘莫测。事实上,这两种方法之间的差距从未像现在这么大。本章将探讨其中一些问题的持久性及其近期影响。