Cratsley Kelso
Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Healy Hall, Washington, D.C., 20057, USA.
Monash Bioeth Rev. 2015 Jun-Sep;33(2-3):210-8. doi: 10.1007/s40592-015-0036-9.
Given that the concept of coercion remains a central concern for bioethics, Quigley's (Monash Bioethics Rev 32:141-158, 2014) recent article provides a helpful analysis of its frequent misapplication in debates over the use of 'nudges'. In this commentary I present a generally sympathetic response to Quigley's argument while also raising several issues that are important for the larger debates about nudges and coercion. I focus on several closely related topics, including the definition of coercion, the role of empirical research, and the normative concerns at the core of these disputes. I suggest that while a degree of precision is certainly required when deploying the relevant concepts, perhaps informed by empirical data, we need to continue to push these debates towards more pressing normative considerations.
鉴于强制概念仍是生物伦理学的核心关注点,奎格利(《莫纳什生物伦理学评论》第32卷:141 - 158页,2014年)最近的文章对其在关于“助推”使用的辩论中频繁被误用的情况进行了有益分析。在这篇评论中,我对奎格利的观点总体上持赞同态度,同时也提出几个对于关于助推和强制的更广泛辩论很重要的问题。我关注几个密切相关的主题,包括强制的定义、实证研究的作用以及这些争议核心的规范性关切。我认为,虽然在运用相关概念时确实需要一定程度的精确性,或许可参考实证数据,但我们需要继续将这些辩论推向更紧迫的规范性考量。