Besharati Sahba, Forkel Stephanie J, Kopelman Michael, Solms Mark, Jenkinson Paul M, Fotopoulou Aikaterini
1 Department of Psychology, King's College London, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Neuroscience, UK 2 Department of Psychology, University of Cape Town, South Africa 3 Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, UK.
3 Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, UK 4 Natbrainlab, Department of Neuroimaging, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Neuroscience, King's College London, UK.
Brain. 2016 Mar;139(Pt 3):971-85. doi: 10.1093/brain/awv390. Epub 2016 Jan 24.
Following right-hemisphere damage, a specific disorder of motor awareness can occur called anosognosia for hemiplegia, i.e. the denial of motor deficits contralateral to a brain lesion. The study of anosognosia can offer unique insights into the neurocognitive basis of awareness. Typically, however, awareness is assessed as a first person judgement and the ability of patients to think about their bodies in more 'objective' (third person) terms is not directly assessed. This may be important as right-hemisphere spatial abilities may underlie our ability to take third person perspectives. This possibility was assessed for the first time in the present study. We investigated third person perspective taking using both visuospatial and verbal tasks in right-hemisphere stroke patients with anosognosia (n = 15) and without anosognosia (n = 15), as well as neurologically healthy control subjects (n = 15). The anosognosic group performed worse than both control groups when having to perform the tasks from a third versus a first person perspective. Individual analysis further revealed a classical dissociation between most anosognosic patients and control subjects in mental (but not visuospatial) third person perspective taking abilities. Finally, the severity of unawareness in anosognosia patients was correlated to greater impairments in such third person, mental perspective taking abilities (but not visuospatial perspective taking). In voxel-based lesion mapping we also identified the lesion sites linked with such deficits, including some brain areas previously associated with inhibition, perspective taking and mentalizing, such as the inferior and middle frontal gyri, as well as the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri. These results suggest that neurocognitive deficits in mental perspective taking may contribute to anosognosia and provide novel insights regarding the relation between self-awareness and social cognition.
右侧大脑半球受损后,可能会出现一种特定的运动意识障碍,称为偏瘫失认症,即否认与脑损伤对侧的运动功能缺陷。对失认症的研究可以为意识的神经认知基础提供独特的见解。然而,通常情况下,意识是通过第一人称判断来评估的,而患者以更“客观”(第三人称)的方式思考自己身体的能力并未得到直接评估。这可能很重要,因为右侧大脑半球的空间能力可能是我们采取第三人称视角的能力基础。本研究首次评估了这种可能性。我们使用视觉空间和语言任务,对患有失认症(n = 15)和未患有失认症(n = 15)的右侧大脑半球中风患者以及神经功能正常的对照受试者(n = 15)进行了第三人称视角采择的研究。当必须从第三人称与第一人称视角执行任务时,失认症组的表现比两个对照组都差。个体分析进一步揭示,大多数失认症患者与对照受试者在心理(而非视觉空间)第三人称视角采择能力上存在典型的分离。最后,失认症患者意识缺失的严重程度与这种第三人称心理视角采择能力(而非视觉空间视角采择能力)的更大损伤相关。在基于体素的病变映射中,我们还确定了与这些缺陷相关的病变部位,包括一些先前与抑制、视角采择和心理化相关的脑区,如下额回和中额回,以及缘上回和颞上回。这些结果表明,心理视角采择方面的神经认知缺陷可能导致失认症,并为自我意识与社会认知之间的关系提供了新的见解。