Wilkinson Dominic
Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
Newborn Care Unit, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, UK.
J Med Ethics. 2017 Apr;43(4):226-229. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2016-103795. Epub 2016 Oct 12.
Decisions about allocation of limited healthcare resources are frequently controversial. These decisions are usually based on careful analysis of medical, scientific and health economic evidence. Yet, decisions are also necessarily based on value judgements. There may be differing views among health professionals about how to allocate resources or how to evaluate existing evidence. In specific cases, professionals may have strong personal views (contrary to professional or societal norms) that treatment should or should not be provided. Could these disagreements rise to the level of a conscientious objection? If so, should conscientious objections to existing allocation decisions be accommodated? In the first part of this paper, I assess whether resource allocation could be a matter of conscience. I analyse conceptual and normative models of conscientious objection and argue that rationing could be a matter for conscience. I distinguish between negative and positive forms: conscientious non-treatment and conscientious treatment. In the second part of the paper, I identify distinctive challenges for conscientious objections to resource allocation. Such objections are almost always inappropriate.
关于有限医疗资源分配的决策常常存在争议。这些决策通常基于对医学、科学和卫生经济学证据的仔细分析。然而,决策也必然基于价值判断。卫生专业人员对于如何分配资源或如何评估现有证据可能存在不同观点。在特定情况下,专业人员可能会有强烈的个人观点(与专业或社会规范相悖),即是否应该提供治疗。这些分歧会上升到良心拒服兵役的层面吗?如果是这样,对现有分配决策的良心拒服兵役应该得到认可吗?在本文的第一部分,我评估资源分配是否可能关乎良心问题。我分析良心拒服兵役的概念和规范模型,并认为配给可能是一个良心问题。我区分了消极和积极形式:良心拒治和良心施治。在本文的第二部分,我指出了对资源分配的良心拒服兵役所面临的独特挑战。这种拒服兵役几乎总是不合适的。