Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada T6G 2H1.
School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06460.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2019 Mar 19;116(12):5254-5261. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1802883116. Epub 2019 Jan 7.
Conventional markets can underprovide ecosystem services. Deliberate creation of a market for ecosystem services [e.g., a payments for ecosystem services (PES) scheme] can close the gap. The new ecosystem service market alters behaviors and quantities of ecosystem service provided and reveals prices for the ecosystems service: a market-clearing equilibrium. Assessing the potential for PES programs, which often act as ecological infrastructure investment mechanisms, requires forecasting the market-clearing equilibrium. Forecasting the equilibrium is complicated, especially at relevant social and ecological scales. It requires greater disciplinary integration than valuing ecosystem services or computing the marginal cost of making a land-use change to produce a service. We conduct an benefit-cost assessment and forecast market-clearing prices and quantities for ecological infrastructure investment contracts in the Panama Canal Watershed. The Panama Canal Authority could offer contracts to private farmers to change land use to increase dry-season water flow and reduce sedimentation. A feasible voluntary contracting system yields a small program of about 1,840 ha of land conversion in a 279,000-ha watershed and generates a 4.9 benefit-cost ratio. Physical and social constraints limit market supply and scalability. Service delays, caused by lags between the time payments must be made and the time services stemming from ecosystem change are realized, hinder program feasibility. Targeting opportunities raise the benefit-cost ratio but reduce the hectares likely to be converted. We compare and contrast our results with prior state-of-the-art assessments on this system.
传统市场可能无法充分提供生态系统服务。有意创建一个生态系统服务市场[例如,生态系统服务付费(PES)计划]可以弥补这一差距。新的生态系统服务市场改变了提供生态系统服务的行为和数量,并揭示了生态系统服务的价格:市场出清均衡。评估生态系统服务付费计划(通常作为生态基础设施投资机制发挥作用)的潜力需要预测市场出清均衡。预测均衡非常复杂,尤其是在相关的社会和生态规模上。它需要比评估生态系统服务或计算改变土地用途以提供服务的边际成本更大的学科整合。我们对巴拿马运河流域的生态基础设施投资合同进行了成本效益评估和市场出清价格预测。巴拿马运河管理局可以向私人农民提供合同,以改变土地用途,增加旱季水流并减少泥沙淤积。可行的自愿承包制度可在 279,000 公顷流域内转化约 1,840 公顷土地,产生 4.9 的成本效益比。物理和社会限制限制了市场供应和可扩展性。服务延迟,即从支付款项到生态系统变化产生服务之间的时间滞后,阻碍了计划的可行性。有针对性的机会提高了成本效益比,但减少了可能转化的公顷数。我们将这些结果与该系统的先前最先进评估进行了比较和对比。