Schäfer Leon-Philip
Leibniz Universität Hannover, Institut für Philosophie, Germany.
Bioethics. 2019 Nov;33(9):1059-1064. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12650. Epub 2019 Aug 28.
In his book The future of human nature, Jürgen Habermas argues against a scenario of liberal eugenics, in which parents are free to prenatally manipulate their children's genetic constitution via germline interventions. In this paper, I draw attention to the fact that his species-ethical line of argument is pervaded by a substantial ambiguity between an argument from actual intervention (AAI) and an argument from mere controllability (AMC). Whereas the first argument focuses on threats for the autonomy and equality of prenatally modified persons, the second argument takes all human beings, whether they have been modified or not, into account. Hence, when invoking Habermas in these debates, bioethicists need to consider carefully which argument they are referring to.
于尔根·哈贝马斯在其著作《人性的未来》中反对自由优生学的设想,即在这种设想中,父母可通过生殖系干预在产前自由操控其子女的基因构成。在本文中,我提请注意这样一个事实,即他的物种伦理论证思路在实际干预论证(AAI)和单纯可控性论证(AMC)之间存在严重的歧义。前者论证聚焦于对经产前改造者的自主性和平等性的威胁,而后者论证则将所有人类,无论其是否已被改造,都纳入考量。因此,在这些辩论中援引哈贝马斯的观点时,生物伦理学家需要仔细考虑他们所指的是哪种论证。