Pytlik Nico, Soll Daniel, Mehl Stephanie
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy & Center for Mind, Brain and Behavior (MCMBB), Philipps-University, Marburg, Germany.
Department of Health and Social Work, Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
Front Psychiatry. 2020 Sep 18;11:568942. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.568942. eCollection 2020.
The belief in conspiracy theories and paranoid ideation are often treated as almost synonymous. However, there is to date no research concerning shared underlying cognitive underpinnings of belief in conspiracy theories and paranoid ideation. One potential underlying factor could be the well-known jumping to conclusion (JTC) bias, the tendency of persons with delusions to perform hasty decisions that are sometimes based on little evidence. Furthermore, a preference for a more intuitive general thinking style, as opposed to an analytical thinking style, could be an additional underlying cognitive factor of both conspiracy theories and paranoia. Thus, the aim of the present study is to investigate in a large sample of non-clinical individuals whether the JTC-bias is more pronounced in individuals who display a stronger belief in conspiracy theories and whether both are related to a more intuitive thinking preference.
We assessed the data of 519 non-clinical individuals regarding their respective approval of 20 specific conspiracy theories in an online study. Further, we assessed the JTC-bias by using a computerized variant of the beads task (fish task). Thinking preferences were measured with the Rational-Experiential Interview.
Subjects who displayed the JTC-bias presented a more pronounced belief in conspiracy theories. In addition, gathering little information in the fish task before performing a decision (less draws to decision) was related to a stronger endorsement of conspiracy theories and a more intuitive thinking style (and a less analytic thinking style). Finally, a preference for intuitive thinking predicted a stronger belief in conspiracy theories in a multiple regression analysis.
Our results demonstrate the implication of a preference for an intuitive thinking style accompanied by a propensity to faster decision-making (JTC-bias) as possible cognitive underpinnings of beliefs in conspiracy theories. Furthermore, our study is the first to confirm the notion of the JTC-bias as a reflection of the use of an intuitive thinking style.
对阴谋论的信念和偏执观念常常被视为几乎同义。然而,迄今为止,尚无关于阴谋论信念和偏执观念共同潜在认知基础的研究。一个潜在的基础因素可能是众所周知的急于下结论(JTC)偏差,即有妄想的人倾向于做出有时基于极少证据的仓促决定。此外,与分析性思维方式相对,对更直观的一般思维方式的偏好可能是阴谋论和偏执的另一个潜在认知因素。因此,本研究的目的是在大量非临床个体样本中调查,JTC偏差在对阴谋论信念更强的个体中是否更明显,以及两者是否都与更直观的思维偏好相关。
在一项在线研究中,我们评估了519名非临床个体对20种特定阴谋论的各自认可程度的数据。此外,我们通过使用珠子任务(鱼类任务)的计算机化变体来评估JTC偏差。思维偏好通过理性 - 经验访谈进行测量。
表现出JTC偏差的受试者对阴谋论的信念更为明显。此外,在鱼类任务中做决定前收集的信息较少(较少的抽取次数以做出决定)与对阴谋论的更强认可以及更直观的思维方式(和较少的分析性思维方式)相关。最后,在多元回归分析中,对直观思维的偏好预测了对阴谋论的更强信念。
我们的结果表明,对直观思维方式的偏好以及更快做出决策的倾向(JTC偏差)可能是阴谋论信念的认知基础。此外,我们的研究首次证实了JTC偏差是直观思维方式使用的一种反映这一观点。