Browning Heather, Veit Walter
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, London WC2A 2AE, UK.
School of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney 2006, Australia.
Animals (Basel). 2021 Apr 17;11(4):1148. doi: 10.3390/ani11041148.
The keeping of captive animals in zoos and aquariums has long been controversial. Many take freedom to be a crucial part of animal welfare and, on these grounds, criticise all forms of animal captivity as harmful to animal welfare, regardless of their provisions. Here, we analyse what it might mean for freedom to matter to welfare, distinguishing between the role of freedom as an intrinsic good, valued for its own sake and an instrumental good, its value arising from the increased ability to provide other important resources. Too often, this debate is conducted through trading intuitions about what matters for animals. We argue for the need for the collection of comparative welfare data about wild and captive animals in order to settle the issue. Discovering more about the links between freedom and animal welfare will then allow for more empirically informed ethical decisions regarding captive animals.
长期以来,在动物园和水族馆饲养圈养动物一直存在争议。许多人认为自由是动物福利的关键组成部分,基于这一理由,他们批评所有形式的动物圈养对动物福利有害,无论其提供了何种条件。在此,我们分析自由对福利而言可能意味着什么,区分自由作为一种因其自身价值而被重视的内在善以及一种工具善的角色,工具善的价值源于提供其他重要资源的能力增强。通常,这场辩论是通过就对动物而言重要的事物交换直觉来进行的。我们主张需要收集有关野生动物和圈养动物的比较福利数据,以便解决这一问题。更多地了解自由与动物福利之间的联系,将有助于就圈养动物做出更基于实证的伦理决策。