Suppr超能文献

突发公共卫生事件国际联防联控决策分析

Decision analysis of international joint prevention and control of public health emergencies.

作者信息

Jia Fangju, Wang Dong-Dong, Li Lianshui

机构信息

School of Business, Wuxi University, Wuxi, 214105 China.

School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing, 210044 China.

出版信息

Environ Dev Sustain. 2022 Sep 21:1-22. doi: 10.1007/s10668-022-02666-z.

Abstract

COVID-19 has caused huge losses to countries around the world, and it will not end in a short time. The lack of motivation for international joint prevention and control is one of the important reasons for the global pandemic of COVID-19. How to improve the efforts and level of international joint prevention and control has become an urgent problem to be solved. Considering the long-term and dynamic nature of international joint prevention and control, the differential game method is used to compare and analyze the optimal decisions of countries in the three scenarios of spontaneous governance, external subsidies and internal cost sharing. The results show that the optimal prevention and control efforts of countries are negatively correlated with discount rates, prevention and control cost coefficients, decay rate and risk factors. It is positively correlated with the impact degree of social benefits, the impact degree of prevention and control efforts on the level of joint prevention and control, the distribution ratio of social benefits, and the impact degree of prevention and control level on social benefits. The prevention and control efforts, joint prevention and control level, social benefits and system benefits under spontaneous governance are the lowest and highest under the internal cost sharing. The internal cost sharing will only be carried out when social benefits distribution ratio obtained reach a certain threshold. This study provides decision-making support for the joint prevention and control of countries to defeat COVID-19 under the normalization of the epidemic.

摘要

新冠疫情给世界各国造成了巨大损失,且短期内不会结束。国际联防联控动力不足是新冠疫情全球大流行的重要原因之一。如何提高国际联防联控的力度和水平已成为亟待解决的问题。考虑到国际联防联控的长期性和动态性,运用微分博弈方法对各国在自主治理、外部补贴和内部成本分担三种情景下的最优决策进行比较分析。结果表明,各国的最优防控力度与贴现率、防控成本系数、衰减率和风险因子呈负相关。与社会效益影响度、防控力度对联防联控水平的影响度、社会效益分配比例以及防控水平对社会效益的影响度呈正相关。自主治理下的防控力度、联防联控水平、社会效益和系统效益最低,内部成本分担下最高。只有当获得的社会效益分配比例达到一定阈值时才会进行内部成本分担。本研究为各国在疫情常态化下联合防控战胜新冠疫情提供决策支持。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3073/9491675/407de3d707ef/10668_2022_2666_Fig1_HTML.jpg

文献AI研究员

20分钟写一篇综述,助力文献阅读效率提升50倍。

立即体验

用中文搜PubMed

大模型驱动的PubMed中文搜索引擎

马上搜索

文档翻译

学术文献翻译模型,支持多种主流文档格式。

立即体验