School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4773-5453.
School of Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona; School of Sus-tainability, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.
J Emerg Manag. 2022;19(8):25-40. doi: 10.5055/jem.0590.
Hurricane Irma then Maria hit Puerto Rico in September 2017, exposing the heightened vulnerability of the island's Critical Infrastructure Systems and Processes (CRISPs) and putting the resilience of some of the most impoverished communities to the test. Being one of these CRISPs, the island's centralized drinking water system operated by the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority suffered heavy damage leaving over 200,000 people off-grid for months. Decentralized community aqueducts were also affected. However, most were able to sustain operations, with only 15 percent incapacitated during the first few weeks after Maria. Of the 205 community aqueducts serving low-income communities in the island's central mountainous areas, only 35 failed. This article explores how and why these systems failed and what actions the communities should take to recover in a relatively short time in comparison to the centralized system. It defines the factors that account for the differences, the systems' capacity to meet water quality requirements, and potentially transformative adaptations generated to face future disturbances. We were interested in understanding (a) how system capacity was affected by the restoration process, (b) if adaptation resulted in significant operational changes, and (c) community member engagement. Finally, we explored governance transformations that increased stakeholder's participation, including community aqueducts representatives in decision-making and policy-making. Data collection included interviews with water system managers, government, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives who regulate these systems or assisted communities in recovering their systems. We also surveyed water systems that had operational problems within the first 3 weeks. The data revealed a diversity of actions along the disaster cycle through which communities prepared for, restored, recovered, and cocreated transformative adaptations to their systems. Findings reflect that despite economic deficiencies and lack of emergency plans, many communities were able to improvise and restore their water systems soon after the disaster. As part of their postdisaster organization, communities increased their collaborative networks with governmental and NGOs to cocreate improvement projects to enhance resiliency. Adaptations included (1) increased community autonomy, (2) system redundancy, and (3) improved capacity to participate in government discussion forums related to their systems.
2017 年 9 月,飓风“艾尔玛”和“玛丽亚”袭击波多黎各,暴露了该岛关键基础设施系统和流程(CRISPs)的高度脆弱性,考验了一些最贫困社区的恢复能力。作为这些 CRISPs 之一,由波多黎各自来水和污水管理局运营的该岛集中式饮用水系统遭受了严重破坏,导致 20 多万人数月无法用电。分散式社区自来水系统也受到了影响。然而,大多数系统能够维持运行,只有 15%的系统在玛丽亚飓风过后的头几周内无法运行。在该岛中部山区为低收入社区服务的 205 个社区自来水系统中,只有 35 个系统失败。本文探讨了这些系统为何以及如何失败,以及与集中式系统相比,社区应采取哪些行动在相对较短的时间内恢复。它定义了导致差异的因素、系统满足水质要求的能力以及为应对未来干扰而产生的潜在变革性适应。我们感兴趣的是了解:(a)系统容量如何受到恢复过程的影响;(b)适应是否导致重大运营变化;(c)社区成员的参与。最后,我们探讨了增加利益相关者参与的治理转型,包括让社区自来水系统代表参与决策和政策制定。数据收集包括对自来水系统管理人员、政府和非政府组织(NGO)代表的采访,这些代表管理这些系统或协助社区恢复其系统。我们还对在头 3 周内出现运营问题的自来水系统进行了调查。数据显示,在灾害周期中,社区采取了多种行动,为灾害做好准备、恢复、恢复和共同创造对其系统的变革性适应。调查结果反映出,尽管存在经济缺陷和缺乏应急预案,许多社区在灾害发生后不久就能即兴发挥并恢复其供水系统。作为其灾后组织的一部分,社区增加了与政府和非政府组织的合作网络,共同创建了提高恢复力的改进项目。适应措施包括:(1)增强社区自主权;(2)系统冗余;(3)提高参与与系统相关的政府论坛的能力。