Christopher Cai (
Zirui Song, Harvard University and Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts.
Health Aff (Millwood). 2024 May;43(5):666-673. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2023.00942.
Private equity (PE) acquisitions in health care delivery nearly tripled from 2010 to 2020. Despite concerns around clinical and economic implications, policy responses have remained limited. We discuss the US policy landscape around PE ownership, using policies in the European Union for comparison. We present four domains in which policy can be strengthened. First, to improve oversight of acquisitions, policy makers should lower reporting thresholds, review sequential acquisitions that together affect market power, automate reviews with potential denials based on market concentration effects, consider new regulatory mechanisms such as attorney general veto, and increase funding for this work. Second, policy makers should increase the longer-run transparency of PE ownership, including the health care prices garnered by acquired entities. Third, policy makers should protect patients and providers by establishing minimum staffing ratios, spending floors for direct patient care, and limits on layoffs and the sale of real estate after acquisition (forms of "asset stripping"). Finally, policy makers should mitigate risky financial behavior by limiting the amount or proportion of debt used to finance PE acquisitions in health care.
私募股权投资(PE)在医疗服务领域的收购活动从 2010 年到 2020 年几乎增长了两倍。尽管人们对其临床和经济影响表示担忧,但政策反应仍然有限。我们讨论了美国围绕私募股权投资的所有权的政策环境,并进行了欧盟政策的对比。我们提出了四个可以加强政策的领域。首先,为了加强对收购活动的监督,决策者应降低报告门槛,审查对市场影响力产生累积影响的连续收购,利用基于市场集中效应的潜在否决权自动审查,考虑引入新的监管机制,如检察长否决权,并为此项工作提供资金。其次,决策者应提高私募股权投资所有权的长期透明度,包括收购实体获得的医疗保健价格。第三,决策者应通过建立最低人员配备比例、直接患者护理的支出下限以及限制收购后的裁员和房地产出售(“资产剥离”的形式)来保护患者和提供者。最后,决策者应通过限制用于为医疗保健领域的私募股权投资收购提供资金的债务金额或比例来减轻高风险的财务行为。