Khan Mishal, Noor Muhammad Naveed, Rahman-Shepherd Afifah, Siddiqui Amna Rehana, Khan Sabeen Sharif, van der Mark Nina, Isani Afshan Khurshid, Siddiqi Ahson Q, Opondo Charles, Ziauddin Faisal, Bhutto Faiza, Azam Iqbal, Hanefeld Johanna, Ali Natasha, Khan Robyna Irshad, Kazmi Syed Ahmed Raza, Wiseman Virginia, Aftab Wafa, Mirza Zafar, Hasan Zainab, Siddiqi Sameen, Hasan Rumina, Shakoor Sadia
Faculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
BMJ Glob Health. 2025 Jan 15;9(12):e016055. doi: 10.1136/bmjgh-2024-016055.
Incentive-linked prescribing, which is when healthcare providers accept incentives from pharmaceutical companies for prescribing promoted medicines, is a form of bribery that harms patients and health systems globally. We developed a novel method using data collectors posing as pharmaceutical company sales representatives to evaluate private doctors' engagement in incentive-linked prescribing and the impact of a multifaceted educational intervention on reducing this practice in Karachi, Pakistan.
We made a sampling frame of all doctors running for-profit, primary-care clinics and randomly allocated participants to control and intervention groups (1:1). The intervention group received a multifaceted seminar on ethical prescribing and reinforcement messages over 6 weeks. The control group attended a seminar without mention of ethical prescribing. The primary outcome was the proportion of participants agreeing to accept incentives in exchange for prescribing promoted medicines from data collectors posing as pharmaceutical company representatives, 3 months after the seminars.
We enrolled 419 of 440 eligible participants. Of 210 participants randomly allocated to the intervention group, 135 (64%) attended the intervention seminar and of 209 participants allocated to the control group, 132 (63%) attended the placebo seminar. The primary outcome was assessed in 130 (96%) and 124 (94%) of intervention and control participants, respectively. No participants detected the covert data collectors. 52 control group doctors (41.9%) agreed to accept incentives as compared with 42 intervention group doctors (32.3%). After adjusting for doctors' age, sex and clinic district, there was no evidence of the intervention's impact on the primary outcome (OR 0.70 [95% CI 0.40 to 1.20], p=0.192).
This first study to covertly assess deal-making between doctors and pharmaceutical company representatives demonstrated that the practice is strikingly widespread in the study setting and suggested that substantial reductions are unlikely to be achieved by educational interventions alone. Our novel method provides an opportunity to generate evidence on deal-making between doctors and pharmaceutical companies elsewhere.
激励关联处方行为是指医疗服务提供者因开具促销药品而接受制药公司的激励,这是一种贿赂形式,在全球范围内损害患者和卫生系统。我们开发了一种新方法,利用假扮制药公司销售代表的数据收集者来评估巴基斯坦卡拉奇私立医生参与激励关联处方行为的情况,以及多方面教育干预对减少这种行为的影响。
我们为所有经营营利性基层医疗诊所的医生制作了抽样框架,并将参与者随机分配到对照组和干预组(1:1)。干预组在6周内参加了关于道德处方和强化信息的多方面研讨会。对照组参加了一个未提及道德处方的研讨会。主要结果是研讨会3个月后,同意接受激励以换取开具制药公司代表推广药品的参与者比例。
我们从440名符合条件的参与者中招募了419名。随机分配到干预组的210名参与者中,135名(64%)参加了干预研讨会;分配到对照组的209名参与者中,132名(63%)参加了安慰剂研讨会。分别在130名(96%)干预组参与者和124名(94%)对照组参与者中评估了主要结果。没有参与者发现秘密的数据收集者。52名对照组医生(41.9%)同意接受激励,而干预组有42名医生(32.3%)同意。在对医生的年龄、性别和诊所所在地区进行调整后,没有证据表明干预对主要结果有影响(比值比0.70 [95%置信区间0.40至1.20],p = 0.192)。
这项首次对医生与制药公司代表之间交易行为进行秘密评估的研究表明,在研究环境中这种行为非常普遍,并表明仅靠教育干预不太可能大幅减少这种行为。我们的新方法为在其他地方生成关于医生与制药公司之间交易行为的证据提供了机会。