Mills M J
Psychiatry Service, West Los Angeles VAMC, Brentwood, California 90073.
Psychiatr Med. 1984 Sep;2(3):245-61.
This paper has presented a discussion of the three overlapping phases in the regulation of psychiatric treatment: consent, patients' rights, and physicians' duties. The concepts of consent are relatively well defined. Still, the courts sometimes utilize the rubric of consent to decide difficult cases (e.g., Clites). One can predict that litigation attempting to further define the specific aspects of consent for high-risk therapies will continue. Because of the court's decision in Youngberg, one can also predict that there will be more litigation as to the constituents of constitutionally-adequate treatment. Given the court's dicta in that case, about deferring to professional judgment, it is impossible to know how these cases will fare if and when they are reviewed by the Supreme Court. Given the court's decisions in Mills and Rennie, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will be ruling on a broad constitutionally-based right to refuse treatment for some time. The most active interface of psychiatry and law is that detailing physicians' duties. In terms of dangerousness, the majority of cases require that psychiatrists attempt to protect victims, or classes of victims, when they believe that dangerous conduct is apt to occur. Still unclear is the extent to which the courts will inquire specifically into the clinical decision-making process to determine whether the physician "reasonably should have known" that the patient was dangerous. Also unclear is the extent to which the courts will find that physicians owe a duty to an ill-defined class. Still, a reasonable guess would be that other courts will find Lipari persuasive. Finally, with regard to specific treatment modalities, it is evident that physicians are being required to practice with an extra measure of care and caution when prescribing neuroleptics, ECT, or psychosurgery. One final note: Too often, physicians have been leery of the political process. Since many decisions with great impact on patients and practitioners are political, this author would urge physicians to engage in that process to secure more reasonable and more equitable medical regulation.
同意、患者权利和医生职责。同意的概念相对明确。然而,法院有时会利用同意这一类别来裁决疑难案件(例如,克利茨案)。可以预见,试图进一步界定高风险治疗同意具体方面的诉讼将继续存在。由于法院在扬伯格案中的裁决,还可以预见,关于符合宪法要求的治疗要素的诉讼将会增多。鉴于法院在该案中关于尊重专业判断的判决,无法得知这些案件若由最高法院复审会有怎样的结果。鉴于法院在米尔斯案和伦尼案中的判决,最高法院在一段时间内不太可能就基于宪法的广泛拒绝治疗权做出裁决。精神病学与法律最活跃的交叉领域是详细规定医生职责的方面。就危险性而言,大多数案件要求精神科医生在认为危险行为可能发生时,尝试保护受害者或某类受害者。目前尚不清楚法院会在多大程度上具体调查临床决策过程,以确定医生是否“理应合理知晓”患者具有危险性。同样不清楚法院会在多大程度上认定医生对一个界定不明确的类别负有责任。不过,合理猜测是其他法院会认为利帕里案具有说服力。最后,关于具体治疗方式,显然在开抗精神病药物、进行电休克治疗或精神外科手术时,要求医生格外小心谨慎。最后一点说明:医生常常对政治程序持谨慎态度。由于许多对患者和从业者有重大影响的决策都是政治性的,作者敦促医生参与该程序,以确保获得更合理、更公平的医疗监管。