Staten M, Dunkelberg W, Umbeck J
J Health Econ. 1987 Mar;6(1):43-58. doi: 10.1016/0167-6296(87)90030-0.
Researchers in health care financing have claimed that large private insurers like Blue Cross frequently exercise monopsony power to obtain discounts from normal hospital charges. They claim that the monopsony power derives from a large Blue Cross share of a given hospital 'cost shifting', whereby hospitals offset the discount by raising charges to less powerful customers. This paper re-examines both theoretically and empirically the conditions necessary for a private insurer to extract discounts from a hospital. We demonstrate that the theoretical conditions necessary for Blue Cross to force a discount do not exist in the Indiana market. Using revenue data from 110 Indiana hospitals we reject the traditional claim that Blue Cross pays less than other insurers as a function of market share.
医疗保健融资领域的研究人员称,像蓝十字这样的大型私人保险公司经常行使买方垄断势力,以从医院正常收费中获取折扣。他们声称,这种买方垄断势力源于蓝十字在特定医院“成本转嫁”中所占的很大份额,即医院通过提高对实力较弱客户的收费来抵消折扣。本文从理论和实证两方面重新审视了私人保险公司从医院获取折扣所需的条件。我们证明,蓝十字迫使医院打折所需的理论条件在印第安纳州市场并不存在。利用印第安纳州110家医院的收入数据,我们驳斥了传统观点,即蓝十字支付的费用低于其他保险公司,且这是市场份额的函数。