Baars B J
Wright Institute, USA.
J Gen Psychol. 1999 Jul;126(3):224-33. doi: 10.1080/00221309909595364.
A common confound between consciousness and attention makes it difficult to think clearly about recent advances in the understanding of the visual brain. Visual consciousness involves phenomenal experience of the visual world, but visual attention is more plausibly treated as a function that selects and maintains the selection of potential conscious contents, often unconsciously. In the same sense, eye movements select conscious visual events, which are not the same as conscious visual experience. According to common sense, visual experience is consciousness, and selective processes are labeled as attention. The distinction is reflected in very different behavioral measures and in very different brain anatomy and physiology. Visual consciousness tends to be associated with the "what" stream of visual feature neurons in the ventral temporal lobe. In contrast, attentional selection and maintenance are mediated by other brain regions, ranging from superior colliculi to thalamus, prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate. The author applied the common-sense distinction between attention and consciousness to the theoretical positions of M. I. Posner (1992, 1994) and D. LaBerge (1997, 1998) to show how it helps to clarify the evidence. He concluded that clarity of thought is served by calling a thing by its proper name.
意识与注意力之间常见的混淆使得我们难以清晰地思考视觉大脑理解方面的最新进展。视觉意识涉及对视觉世界的现象体验,但视觉注意力更合理地被视为一种功能,它选择并维持对潜在意识内容的选择,且往往是无意识的。同样,眼球运动选择有意识的视觉事件,而这些事件与有意识的视觉体验并不相同。根据常识,视觉体验就是意识,而选择过程则被标记为注意力。这种区别体现在截然不同的行为测量以及截然不同的脑解剖学和生理学中。视觉意识往往与腹侧颞叶中视觉特征神经元的“什么”流相关联。相比之下,注意力的选择和维持由其他脑区介导,范围从上级丘到丘脑、前额叶皮层和前扣带回。作者将注意力与意识之间的常识性区别应用于M. I. 波斯纳(1992年、1994年)和D. 拉伯格(1997年、1998年)的理论立场,以展示它如何有助于澄清证据。他得出结论,通过恰当地称呼事物能使思维清晰。