Corlett J A
Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University, 5500 Companile Drive, San Diego, CA 92182-8142, USA.
Health Care Anal. 2001;9(1):41-63. doi: 10.1023/A:1011355028021.
In recent years, there has been a great deal of philosophical discussion about the alleged moral right to die. If there is such a moral right, then it would seem to imply a moral duty of others to not interfere with the exercise of the right. And this might have important implications for public policy insofar as public policy ought to track what is morally right. But is there a moral duty to die? If so, under what conditions, if any, ought one to have such a duty, and why? In this paper, I distinguish between different moral grounds for the putative moral duty to die: deontological, intuitionist, and contractarian. Subsequently, I argue in support of Paul Menzel's theory of health care distribution. More precisely, I concur with his claim that there is a moral duty to die inexpensively in health care contexts. Then I provide and defend a philosophical analysis of the conditions in which such a duty could exist.
近年来，围绕所谓的道德死亡权展开了大量哲学讨论。如果存在这样一种道德权利，那么似乎意味着其他人有道德义务不干涉该权利的行使。而且，这可能对公共政策产生重要影响，因为公共政策应该遵循道德正确的事情。但是否存在死亡的道德义务呢？如果存在，在何种条件下（如果有的话）一个人应该承担这样的义务，以及原因是什么？在本文中，我区分了假定的死亡道德义务的不同道德依据：道义论的、直觉主义的和契约主义的。随后，我论证支持保罗·门泽尔的医疗保健分配理论。更确切地说，我赞同他的观点，即在医疗保健背景下存在以低成本死亡的道德义务。然后我对这种义务可能存在的条件进行了哲学分析并为之辩护。
