Salij J
Ul. Freta 10, 00-227 Warszawa, Poland.
Med Wieku Rozwoj. 2001;5(1 Suppl 1):75-80.
One does not see a possibility for moral justification of the cloning of humans, or of any other experiments and manipulation of human embryos other than on the grounds of materialistic anthropology which reduces human spirituality to the dimensions dealt with by natural sciences. If, however, man is a person, and if "to be a person" constitutes an ontological situation and is not the result of some kind of social contract, and if the human embryo is, at least potentially a person, then the Kantian personalistic norm will demand a ban on the cloning of humans and on experimenting on human embryos, and will also exclude any attitude of ownership towards each human being. This demand seems all the more clear if we look at the personalistic norm from the point of view of what is most wonderful in being a person namely, that the person is capable of receiving, learning and giving love. The deficiency of love received at the beginning of somebody's life - even if he or she was conceived out of love - may be a cause of this person becoming closed to higher values. Thus, the idea of cloning human beings means to structurally remove love from the beginning of human life and to introduce technology instead. One cannot really do more harm to another person than by depriving him or her of love at the very beginning of his or her life. I think that the well known stories about Golem or Frankenstein express a presentation of just this truth - and that is why they are so terrifying.
除了基于将人类精神性简化为自然科学所处理维度的唯物主义人类学之外,人们看不到克隆人类或对人类胚胎进行任何其他实验及操纵的道德正当性可能性。然而,如果人是一个人,如果“成为一个人”构成一种本体论状况而非某种社会契约的结果,如果人类胚胎至少潜在地是一个人,那么康德的人格主义规范将要求禁止克隆人类和对人类胚胎进行实验,并且还将排除对每个人的任何所有权态度。如果我们从作为一个人的最美好之处,即人有能力接受、学习和给予爱的角度来看待人格主义规范,这种要求似乎就更加明确了。一个人在生命开始时所接受的爱的匮乏——即使他或她是出于爱而孕育的——可能是这个人对更高价值变得封闭的一个原因。因此,克隆人类的想法意味着从人类生命开始就从结构上消除爱并代之以技术。一个人对另一个人造成的伤害,没有比在其生命伊始就剥夺他或她的爱更大的了。我认为,关于泥人或弗兰肯斯坦的著名故事恰恰表达了这一真理——这就是它们如此可怕的原因。