Town R
Graduate School of Management, University of California, Irvine 92697-3125, USA.
J Health Econ. 2001 Nov;20(6):967-90. doi: 10.1016/s0167-6296(01)00104-7.
This paper estimates the welfare consequences of HMO mergers using data from California's small-group market. The analysis estimates the parameters from a differentiated products demand system. The parameters are then used to simulate the effects of several HMO mergers by solving for the Nash equilibrium in prices under different ownership structures. Even small mergers in moderately concentrated markets can result in significant consumer surplus reductions. However, these welfare losses can be offset by large efficiency gains. The welfare consequences of HMO mergers turn less upon demand-side considerations than on the health plan's ability to realize efficiencies.
本文利用加利福尼亚小团体市场的数据估计了健康维护组织(HMO)合并对福利的影响。该分析从差异化产品需求系统中估计参数。然后,通过求解不同所有权结构下的价格纳什均衡,使用这些参数来模拟几次HMO合并的影响。即使是在适度集中的市场中进行的小规模合并,也可能导致消费者剩余大幅减少。然而,这些福利损失可以被大幅的效率提升所抵消。HMO合并对福利的影响与其说是取决于需求侧因素,不如说是取决于健康计划实现效率的能力。