Stein Mark S
Yale University, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 20831, New Haven, CT 06520-8301, USA.
Bioethics. 2002 Feb;16(1):1-19. doi: 10.1111/1467-8519.00264.
Utilitarianism is more convincing than resource egalitarianism or welfare egalitarianism as a theory of how resources should be distributed between disabled people and nondisabled people. Unlike resource egalitarianism, utilitarianism can redistribute resources to the disabled when they would benefit more from those resources than nondisabled people. Unlike welfare egalitarianism, utilitarianism can halt redistribution when the disabled would no longer benefit more than the nondisabled from additional resources. The author considers one objection to this view: it has been argued, by Sen and others, that there are circumstances under which utilitarianism would unfairly distribute fewer resources to the physically disabled than to nondisabled people, on the ground that the disabled would derive less benefit from those resources. In response, the author claims that critics of utilitarianism have fallaciously exaggerated the circumstances under which the disabled would benefit less than the nondisabled from additional resources. In those limited circumstances in which the disabled really would benefit less from resources, the author argues, it does not seem unfair to distribute fewer resources to them.
作为一种关于资源应如何在残疾人和非残疾人之间分配的理论,功利主义比资源平等主义或福利平等主义更具说服力。与资源平等主义不同,当残疾人能比非残疾人从这些资源中获得更多益处时,功利主义可以将资源重新分配给残疾人。与福利平等主义不同,当残疾人从额外资源中获得的益处不再多于非残疾人时,功利主义可以停止重新分配。作者考虑了对这一观点的一种反对意见:森等人认为,在某些情况下,功利主义会不公平地分配给身体残疾者比非残疾者更少的资源,理由是残疾人从这些资源中获得的益处较少。作为回应,作者声称,功利主义的批评者错误地夸大了残疾人从额外资源中获得的益处少于非残疾人的情况。作者认为,在那些残疾人确实从资源中获益较少的有限情况下,分配给他们较少的资源似乎并非不公平。