The Eleventh Circuit holds that agreements in which pharmaceutical companies pay generic companies not to compete may be valid.
作者信息
Garrigues Amy
出版信息
J Law Med Ethics. 2004 Spring;32(1):181-4.
PMID:15152443
Abstract
摘要
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