Kjerstad Egil
Institute for Research in Economics, Bergen, Norway.
Health Econ. 2005 Dec;14(12):1239-51. doi: 10.1002/hec.1004.
Recent contributions in auction and bargaining theory suggest that a procurer should place more faith in the power of competition among alternative suppliers than in his or her own negotiating skill. Based on data from 216 contracts between procurers and suppliers of medical and surgical articles, we test whether auctions and bargaining result in significantly different prices. The main results are that auctions give 'thicker' markets compared with negotiations, as expected, but that auctions do not result in significantly lower prices compared with negotiations.
拍卖与议价理论方面的最新研究表明,采购者应更加相信供应商之间的竞争力量,而非自身的谈判技巧。基于采购者与医疗及外科用品供应商之间216份合同的数据,我们检验了拍卖与议价是否会产生显著不同的价格。主要结果是,正如预期的那样,与谈判相比,拍卖带来了“更活跃”的市场,但与谈判相比,拍卖并未产生显著更低的价格。