Zwanziger Jack, Mooney Cathleen
Health Policy and Administration, School of Public Health, University of Illinois at Chicago, 60612-4394, USA.
Inquiry. 2005 Spring;42(1):73-85. doi: 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_42.1.73.
On Jan. 1, 1997, New York ended its regulation of hospital prices with the intent of using competitive markets to control prices and increase efficiency. This paper uses data that come from annual reports filed by all health maintenance organizations (HMOs) operating in New York and include payments to and usage in the major hospitals in an HMO's network. We estimate the relationship between implied prices and hospital, plan, and market characteristics. The models show that after 1997, hospitals in more competitive markets paid less. Partially offsetting these price reductions were price increases associated with hospital mergers that reduced the competitiveness of the local market. Hospital deregulation was successful, at least in the short run, in using price competition to reduce hospital payments; it is unclear whether this success will be undermined by the structural changes taking place in the hospital industry.
1997年1月1日，纽约终止了对医院价格的管制，旨在利用竞争市场来控制价格并提高效率。本文使用的数据来自在纽约运营的所有健康维护组织（HMO）提交的年度报告，这些数据包括HMO网络中主要医院的支付情况和使用情况。我们估计了隐含价格与医院、计划和市场特征之间的关系。模型显示，1997年之后，处于竞争更激烈市场中的医院支付的费用更低。部分抵消这些价格下降的是与医院合并相关的价格上涨，这降低了当地市场的竞争力。医院放松管制至少在短期内成功地利用价格竞争降低了医院支付费用；目前尚不清楚这一成功是否会受到医院行业正在发生的结构变化的影响。
