Abelev Maxim, Markman Ellen
Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA.
Dev Sci. 2006 Nov;9(6):590-6. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00537.x.
Evidence from theory-of-mind tasks suggests that young children have substantial difficulty thinking about multiple object identity and multiple versions of reality. On the other hand, evidence from children's understanding of pretense indicates that children have little trouble understanding dual object identity and counterfactual scenarios that are involved in pretend play. Two studies reported here show that this competence is not limited to pretend play. Three-year-olds also understand the dual identity involved in unusual functional use (X is being used as Y), even though they have difficulty understanding deceptive appearance (X looks like Y). We suggest that children are able to distinguish extrinsic object properties from intrinsic ones (function vs. category-membership) better than they can distinguish superficial object properties from deep ones (appearance vs. category-membership).
来自心理理论任务的证据表明,幼儿在思考多个物体身份和多个现实版本时存在很大困难。另一方面,来自儿童对假装游戏理解的证据表明,儿童在理解假装游戏中涉及的双重物体身份和反事实情景方面几乎没有困难。这里报道的两项研究表明,这种能力并不局限于假装游戏。三岁儿童也理解不寻常功能使用(X被用作Y)中涉及的双重身份,尽管他们在理解欺骗性外观(X看起来像Y)方面存在困难。我们认为,儿童能够更好地区分外在物体属性与内在物体属性(功能与类别归属),而不是区分表面物体属性与深层物体属性(外观与类别归属)。