Iizuka Toshiaki
Rand J Econ. 2007 Autumn;38(3):844-62. doi: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00115.x.
This article examined the physician-patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the mark-up, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti-hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the mark-up. However, physicians are also sensitive to the patient's out-of-pocket costs. Overall, although the mark-up affects prescription choices, physicians appear more responsive to the patient's out-of-pocket costs than their own profits from mark-up.
本文考察了日本处方药市场背景下的医患委托代理关系。在这个市场中，医生常常既开处方又配药，并能从中获利。一个担忧是，由于加价所产生的激励，医生的处方决策可能会受到扭曲。使用抗高血压药物的实证结果表明，医生的处方选择受到加价的影响。然而，医生也对患者的自付费用很敏感。总体而言，尽管加价会影响处方选择，但比起自己从加价中获得的利润，医生似乎对患者的自付费用更敏感。
