Department of Economics, University of Bologna, and Centre for Household Income Labour and Demographic economics (CHILD), Italy.
Health Policy. 2009 May;90(2-3):140-8. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2008.09.008. Epub 2008 Nov 6.
We investigate the impact on quality of care of the introduction of two financial incentives in primary care contracts in the Italian region Emilia Romagna: pay-for-participation and pay-for-compliance with best practices programs.
We concentrate on patients affected by diabetes mellitus type 2, for which the assumption of responsibility and the adoption of clinical guidelines are specifically rewarded. We test the hypothesis that, other things equal, patients under the responsibility of general practitioners (GPs) receiving a higher share of their income through these programs are less likely to experience hospitalisation for hyperglycaemic emergencies. To this end, we examine the combined influence of physician, organisational and patient factors by means of multilevel modelling for the year 2003.
Programs aimed at stimulating GP assumption of responsibility in disease management significantly reduce the probability of hyperglycaemic emergencies for their patients.
Although it has been recognised that incentive-based remuneration schemes can have an impact on GP behaviour, there is still weak empirical evidence on the extent to which such programs influence healthcare outcomes. Our results support the hypothesis that financial transfers may contribute to improve quality of care, even when they are not based on the ex-post verification of performances.
我们调查了在意大利艾米利亚-罗马涅地区的初级保健合同中引入两种财务激励措施(参与付费和遵守最佳实践方案付费)对医疗质量的影响。
我们集中研究了 2 型糖尿病患者,因为这些患者的责任承担和临床指南的采用都得到了特别奖励。我们假设,在其他条件相同的情况下,通过这些方案获得更高收入份额的全科医生(GP)负责的患者因高血糖急症住院的可能性较低。为此,我们通过 2003 年的多层次模型检验了医生、组织和患者因素的综合影响。
旨在激励 GP 承担疾病管理责任的方案显著降低了其患者发生高血糖急症的概率。
尽管人们已经认识到基于激励的薪酬方案可能会影响 GP 的行为,但关于这些方案在多大程度上影响医疗保健结果的经验证据仍然薄弱。我们的结果支持这样一种假设,即即使财务转移不是基于对绩效的事后验证,它们也可能有助于提高医疗质量。