Böschen Stefan
University of Augsburg, Institut für Soziologie, 86159 Augsburg, Germany.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2009 Jul;16(5):508-20. doi: 10.1007/s11356-009-0164-y. Epub 2009 May 20.
BACKGROUND, AIM, AND SCOPE: Over the last two decades, there has been a remarkable shift of attention to the scientific and political fundamentals of the precautionary principle. The application of this principle has become a main strategy of coping with the different forms and problems related to non-knowledge. Thus, societies are increasingly confronted with the challenging and hitherto unresolved problem of political and technological decision-making under conditions of diverging framings of non-knowledge. At present, there seems to be no generally accepted scientific or institutional approach. This is why the fundamental question of how different scientific actors define and construct evidence is not answered yet. Hence, this paper is based on the consideration that the conflicts in risk policy concerning genetically modified organisms (GMO) depend on the unresolved conflicts about the diverging scientific strategies and structures of evidence-making between the epistemic cultures involved. Thus, this study investigates two questions: (1) do the epistemic strategies of evidence-making differ systematically with the scientific actors involved in the GMO-debate? (2) What consequences emerge considering institutionalized procedures of decision-making?
This article is based on a secondary analysis of findings and perspectives reported in the literature and on the methods of qualitative social empirical research, i.e., interviews with experts. A total number of 34 interviews were conducted to explore the different strategies of handling non-knowledge and constructing evidence. Actors from science, administration, business and NGOs were interviewed. In this way, typical epistemic cultures can be described. An epistemic culture is the constellation of methodological strategies, theoretical assumptions and practical-experimental settings which define in every speciality the ways how we know what we know.
There are two main results. Firstly, it was worked out that the epistemic cultures involved in the GMO-debate use rather distinct strategies to define non-knowledge and to classify evidence. There are three types of constructing evidence, which correspond to different types of epistemic cultures. Secondly, the findings imply that the intensity of the conflicts in risk policy fields like the GMO-debate is due to a lack of knowledge politics. Usually, knowledge politics is restricted to the design of institutional procedures to compile knowledge provided by experts. The institutional setting of risk analysis and risk management is based on the premise of strict separation between knowledge and power. However, inadmissible mixing-up of knowledge and power is observable.
It seems that non-knowledge leads to an epistemic no man's land, and, hence, hybrid regimes of knowledge emerge. These regimes are hybrid with respect to the unclear and not explicitly reflected strategies of evidence-making. By lacking of knowledge politics, this situation opens up 'windows of opportunity' for actors with special interests in risk policy fields like the GMO-debate. Therefore, there is a difference between the visible institutionalized structures of risk policies and the rather invisible hybrid regimes of knowledge. Structure and scope of expertise have to be reflected and new instruments of knowledge politics have to be designed.
Different epistemic cultures can be qualified by describing their particular strategies of evidence-making. To solve the conflicts between these strategies, a meta-expertise is needed. Besides the institutionalized settings of knowledge politics, the underlying hybrid regimes of knowledge have to be identified.
The concept of epistemic cultures and their strategies of evidence-making should be investigated more explicitly with respect to other risk policy fields The analysis of hybrid regimes of knowledge should be deepened by looking at the complex interactions between institutional, discursive and practical rules affecting risk assessment.
背景、目的与范围:在过去二十年里,对预防原则的科学与政治基础的关注发生了显著转变。该原则的应用已成为应对与未知相关的不同形式和问题的主要策略。因此,社会日益面临在对未知的不同界定框架下进行政治和技术决策这一具有挑战性且迄今未解决的问题。目前,似乎不存在普遍接受的科学或制度性方法。这就是为何不同科学行为体如何界定和构建证据这一基本问题尚未得到解答。因此,本文基于这样一种考虑,即关于转基因生物(GMO)的风险政策冲突取决于相关认知文化之间在科学策略和证据构建结构方面未解决的分歧冲突。因此,本研究探讨两个问题:(1)参与转基因生物辩论的科学行为体在证据构建的认知策略上是否存在系统性差异?(2)考虑到制度化的决策程序会产生什么后果?
本文基于对文献中报道的研究结果和观点的二次分析以及定性社会实证研究方法,即对专家进行访谈。总共进行了34次访谈,以探索处理未知和构建证据的不同策略。访谈了来自科学、行政、商业和非政府组织的行为体。通过这种方式,可以描述典型的认知文化。认知文化是方法策略、理论假设和实践 - 实验设置的组合,它们在每个专业领域中定义了我们知晓我们所知晓之事的方式。
有两个主要结果。首先,得出参与转基因生物辩论的认知文化使用相当不同的策略来界定未知并对证据进行分类。存在三种构建证据的类型,它们对应于不同类型的认知文化。其次,研究结果表明,像转基因生物辩论这样的风险政策领域中的冲突强度是由于缺乏知识政治。通常,知识政治仅限于设计制度程序以汇编专家提供的知识。风险分析和风险管理的制度设置基于知识与权力严格分离的前提。然而,可以观察到知识与权力的不当混合。
似乎未知导致了一个认知的无人区,因此出现了混合的知识体系。这些体系在证据构建策略不清晰且未明确反映方面是混合的。由于缺乏知识政治,这种情况为在转基因生物辩论等风险政策领域中有特殊利益的行为体打开了“机会之窗”。因此,风险政策的可见制度化结构与相当无形的混合知识体系之间存在差异。必须反思专业知识的结构和范围,并设计新的知识政治工具。
通过描述其特定的证据构建策略,可以对不同的认知文化进行界定。为了解决这些策略之间的冲突,需要一种元专业知识。除了知识政治的制度化设置外,还必须识别潜在的混合知识体系。
应更明确地针对其他风险政策领域研究认知文化的概念及其证据构建策略。通过审视影响风险评估的制度、话语和实践规则之间的复杂相互作用,深化对混合知识体系的分析。