Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, EP 301, San Francisco, California 94132, United States.
Conscious Cogn. 2010 Dec;19(4):1007-12. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.05.007. Epub 2010 Jun 9.
Can one be fooled into believing that one intended an action that one in fact did not intend? Past experimental paradigms have demonstrated that participants, when provided with false perceptual feedback about their actions, can be fooled into misperceiving the nature of their intended motor act. However, because veridical proprioceptive/perceptual feedback limits the extent to which participants can be fooled, few studies have been able to answer our question and induce the illusion to intend. In a novel paradigm addressing this question, participants were instructed to move a line on the computer screen by use of a phony brain-computer interface. Line movements were actually controlled by computer program. Demonstrating the illusion to intend, participants reported more intentions to move the line when it moved frequently than when it moved infrequently. Consistent with ideomotor theory, the finding illuminates the intimate liaisons among ideomotor processing, the sense of agency, and action production.
人是否可能被误导,从而相信自己产生了某种实际并未产生的意图?过去的实验范式表明,当参与者接收到关于其动作的虚假感知反馈时,他们可能会被误导,从而错误地感知自己的预期动作的性质。然而,由于真实的本体感觉/知觉反馈限制了参与者被误导的程度,因此很少有研究能够回答我们的问题并产生意图的错觉。在一个解决这个问题的新范式中,参与者被指示通过一个虚假的脑机接口在计算机屏幕上移动一条线。实际上,线的移动是由计算机程序控制的。通过证明意图的错觉,参与者报告说,当线频繁移动时,他们更倾向于报告移动线的意图,而当线移动不频繁时,他们更倾向于报告没有移动线的意图。与观念运动理论一致,这一发现阐明了观念运动加工、主体感和动作产生之间的密切联系。