University of Michigan, Department of Economics, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA.
Health Econ. 2010 Sep;19 Suppl:181-206. doi: 10.1002/hec.1635.
This article presents the results from an experimental evaluation of a voluntary health insurance program for informal sector workers in Nicaragua. Costs of the premiums as well as enrollment location were randomly allocated. Overall, take-up of the program was low, with only 20% enrollment. Program costs and streamlined bureaucratic procedures were important determinants of enrollment. Participation of local microfinance institutions had a slight negative effect on enrollment. One year later, those who received insurance substituted toward services at covered facilities and total out-of-pocket expenditures fell. However, total expenditures fell by less than the insurance premiums. We find no evidence of an increase in health-care utilization among the newly insured. We also find very low retention rates after the expiration of the subsidy, with less than 10% of enrollees still enrolled after one year. To shed light on the findings from the experimental results, we present qualitative evidence of institutional and contextual factors that limited the success of this program.
本文介绍了尼加拉瓜针对非正规部门工人的自愿健康保险计划的实验评估结果。保费成本和登记地点都是随机分配的。总体而言,该计划的参保率很低,只有 20%的人参保。计划成本和简化的官僚程序是参保的重要决定因素。当地小额信贷机构的参与对参保率有轻微的负面影响。一年后,那些获得保险的人转向了参保机构的服务,自付费用总额下降。然而,总支出的下降幅度低于保险费。我们没有发现新参保者的医疗保健利用率有任何增加。在补贴期满后,我们也发现保留率非常低,参保一年后仍有不到 10%的参保者续保。为了阐明实验结果中的发现,我们提出了定性证据,说明限制该计划成功的制度和背景因素。