State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, 650223, China.
Statistics and Mathematics College, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, 650221, China.
Sci China Life Sci. 2010 Jan;53(1):139-149. doi: 10.1007/s11427-010-0007-6. Epub 2010 Feb 12.
Explaining "Tragedy of the Commons" of evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. Asymmetrical interaction, which is one of the most important characteristics of cooperative system, has not been sufficiently considered in the existing models of the evolution of cooperation. Considering the inequality in the number and payoff between the cooperative actors and recipients in cooperation systems, discriminative density-dependent interference competition will occur in limited dispersal systems. Our model and simulation show that the local but not the global stability of a cooperative interaction can be maintained if the utilization of common resource remains unsaturated, which can be achieved by density-dependent restraint or competition among the cooperative actors. More intense density dependent interference competition among the cooperative actors and the ready availability of the common resource, with a higher intrinsic contribution ratio of a cooperative actor to the recipient, will increase the probability of cooperation. The cooperation between the recipient and the cooperative actors can be transformed into conflict and, it oscillates chaotically with variations of the affecting factors under different environmental or ecological conditions. The higher initial relatedness (i.e. similar to kin or reciprocity relatedness), which is equivalent to intrinsic contribution ratio of a cooperative actor to the recipient, can be selected for by penalizing less cooperative or cheating actors but rewarding cooperative individuals in asymmetric systems. The initial relatedness is a pivot but not the aim of evolution of cooperation. This explains well the direct conflict observed in almost all cooperative systems.
解释合作进化中的“公地悲剧”仍然是生物学和社会科学面临的最大问题之一。非对称相互作用是合作系统的最重要特征之一,但在现有的合作进化模型中尚未得到充分考虑。考虑到合作系统中合作行为者和接受者之间数量和收益的不平等,在有限的扩散系统中会发生歧视性密度依赖干扰竞争。我们的模型和模拟表明,如果共同资源的利用未达到饱和,合作相互作用的局部而非全局稳定性可以得到维持,这可以通过合作行为者之间的密度依赖抑制或竞争来实现。合作行为者之间更强烈的密度依赖干扰竞争和共同资源的易于获得性,以及合作行为者对接受者的内在贡献比更高,将增加合作的可能性。接受者与合作行为者之间的合作可能会转变为冲突,并在不同的环境或生态条件下,随着影响因素的变化而呈现混沌波动。较高的初始关联性(即类似于亲属或互惠关联性)可以通过惩罚不合作或欺骗的行为者,奖励合作的个体,在非对称系统中得到选择。初始关联性是进化的一个关键,但不是合作进化的目的。这很好地解释了几乎所有合作系统中观察到的直接冲突。