Department of Biological Sciences, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, AB T1K3M4, Canada.
J Theor Biol. 2011 Nov 7;288:84-91. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.023. Epub 2011 Aug 2.
Cooperation, a costly interaction in which individuals benefit one another, plays a crucial role in many of the major transitions of evolution. Yet, as illustrated by the Prisoner's dilemma, cooperative systems are fragile because cooperators can be exploited by defectors who reap the benefits of cooperation but do not reciprocate. This barrier to cooperation may be overcome if cooperators have a recognisable phenotypic tag that allows them to adopt the conditional strategy of cooperating with fellow tag-mates while defecting against others, a mechanism known as the 'green-beard effect'. The resulting intra-tag cooperator strategy is particularly effective in structured populations where local clumps of cooperative tag-mates can find refuge. While intra-tag cooperation is robust against unconditional defectors in the spatial Prisoner's dilemma (at least when the cost of cooperation is low), the role of extra-tag cooperators - individuals who cooperate only with those bearing a different tag - has received little attention, despite the fact that these traitors form mixed-tag aggregations whose heterogeneous makeup potentially allows the exploitation of multiple other strategies. Using a spatial model of the two-tag Prisoner's dilemma, I show that extra-tag cooperation readily evolves under low to intermediate cost-benefit ratios of mutual cooperation (r). Specifically, at low r, mixed-tag aggregations of extra-tag cooperators take over the population, while at intermediate r, such aggregations coexist with intra-tag cooperators and unconditional defectors with whom they engage in non-transitive spatial invasibility. In systems with more than two tags, however, the dilution of extra-tag cooperators within mixed-tag aggregations prevents the strategy from being effective. Thus, the same beard chromodynamics that promotes within-group cooperation also predicts the evolution of traitorous between-group cooperation, but only when the number of beard colours is low.
合作是一种个体之间相互受益的高成本互动,在进化的许多重大转变中都起着至关重要的作用。然而,正如囚徒困境所表明的那样,合作系统很脆弱,因为合作者可能会被背叛者利用,背叛者从合作中受益却不回报。如果合作者有一个可识别的表型标记,可以让他们在与同标记的同伴合作的同时对其他同伴进行背叛,从而采用有条件的合作策略,那么这种合作的障碍就可以克服,这种机制被称为“绿胡子效应”。在具有结构的种群中,局部聚集的合作标记同伴可以找到避难所,因此,产生的标记内合作者策略特别有效。虽然在空间囚徒困境中,标记内合作对无条件的背叛者具有很强的抵抗力(至少在合作成本较低时),但只与具有不同标记的个体合作的额外标记合作者的作用却很少受到关注,尽管这些叛徒形成了混合标记聚集,其异质构成可能会利用多种其他策略。使用双标签囚徒困境的空间模型,我表明,在互惠合作的成本效益比(r)低至中等的情况下,额外标记合作很容易进化。具体来说,在 r 较低时,额外标记合作者的混合标记聚集会接管种群,而在 r 中等时,这种聚集会与标记内合作者和无条件背叛者共存,它们之间会发生非传递性的空间入侵。然而,在具有两个以上标签的系统中,混合标记聚集中额外标记合作者的稀释会阻止该策略的有效性。因此,促进群体内合作的相同胡须动力学也预测了背叛者之间的合作的进化,但只有当胡须颜色的数量较少时才会如此。