Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Psychol Sci. 2013 Aug;24(8):1437-45. doi: 10.1177/0956797612472343. Epub 2013 Jun 7.
People often think that something must have a mind to be part of a moral interaction. However, the present research suggests that minds do not create morality but that morality creates minds. In four experiments, we found that observing intentional harm to an unconscious entity--a vegetative patient, a robot, or a corpse--leads to augmented attribution of mind to that entity. A fifth experiment reconciled these results with extant research on dehumanization by showing that observing the victimization of conscious entities leads to reduced attribution of mind to those entities. Taken together, these experiments suggest that the effects of victimization vary according to victims' preexisting mental status and that people often make an intuitive cognitive error when unconscious entities are placed in harm's way. People assume that if apparent moral harm occurs, then there must be someone there to experience that harm-a harm-made mind. These findings have implications for political policies concerning right-to-life issues.
人们常常认为,只有具备意识的实体才能参与道德互动。然而,目前的研究表明,意识并非道德的起源,而是道德塑造了意识。在四项实验中,我们发现,观察对无意识实体(植物人、机器人或尸体)的有意伤害会导致对该实体的意识归因增强。第五个实验通过表明观察有意识实体的受害会导致对这些实体的意识归因减少,调和了这些结果与现有关于去人性化的研究。这些实验表明,受害者的预先存在的心理状态会影响受害的影响,而且当无意识实体受到伤害时,人们常常会犯一个直观的认知错误。人们认为,如果明显的道德伤害发生了,那么一定有某个实体在经历这种伤害——一种有感知的伤害意识。这些发现对涉及生命权问题的政治政策具有重要意义。