Murdey Jason
Michigan State University College of Law, USA.
Food Drug Law J. 2011;66(1):85-104, ii-iii.
In Buckman v. Plaintiff's Legal Committee, the Supreme Court of the United States held that "fraud on FDA" claims in medical device products liability actions were impliedly preempted by the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). A Michigan statute that provides a complete regulatory compliance defense for drug manufacturers, absent a finding that the manufacturer defrauded or bribed the FDA. The Sixth Circuit found that the statute's fraud exception was preempted under Buckman, extending Buckman's holding to traditional products liability claims with circumstances involving fraud on the FDA. The Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in interpreting the same statute, confining Buckman to its narrow holding, preempting stand-alone fraud on the FDA claims while carving out a space for traditional state tort claims. The Supreme Court left the issue unresolved in its review of the Second Circuit, splitting 4-4. Since then, the great majority of courts have followed the Sixth Circuit's holding. This situation has created serious questions about the ability of Michigan citizens to obtain any relief in an action against a drug manufacturer. The Supreme Court recently refused to find blanket implied preemption for failure-to-warn claims involving prescription drugs in Wyeth v. Levine, holding that "common-law claims do not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's purposes in the FDCA." This holding casts serious doubt on the continued vitality of implied preemption in drug and device litigation, and could, and should, lead to a reexamination of the application of Buckman to traditional products liability claims against drug manufacturers from Michigan plaintiffs in circumstances that involve, inter alia, fraud on the FDA. The next time this application is considered, the court should allow plaintiffs to present evidence tending to show fraud on the FDA in rebutting the manufacturer's presumptive immunity under the Michigan immunity statute.
在“巴克曼诉原告法律委员会”一案中,美国最高法院裁定,医疗器械产品责任诉讼中的“欺诈食品药品监督管理局”索赔主张被《食品、药品和化妆品法案》(FDCA)的《医疗器械修正案》默示性地排除。密歇根州的一项法规规定,除非认定制造商欺诈或贿赂了食品药品监督管理局,否则为药品制造商提供完全符合监管要求的抗辩理由。第六巡回上诉法院认定,该法规的欺诈例外情形根据“巴克曼案”被排除,将“巴克曼案”的判决扩展至涉及欺诈食品药品监督管理局情况的传统产品责任索赔。第二巡回上诉法院在解释同一法规时得出了相反的结论,将“巴克曼案”局限于其狭义的判决,排除独立的欺诈食品药品监督管理局索赔主张,同时为传统的州侵权索赔留出空间。最高法院在对第二巡回上诉法院的审查中未解决该问题,以4比4形成僵局。自那时以来,绝大多数法院遵循了第六巡回上诉法院的判决。这种情况引发了关于密歇根州公民在针对药品制造商的诉讼中获得任何救济的能力的严重问题。最高法院最近在“惠氏诉莱文”案中拒绝认定对涉及处方药的未警示索赔存在全面的默示性排除,裁定“普通法索赔并非实现国会在FDCA中的目的的障碍”。这一裁定严重质疑了默示性排除在药品和器械诉讼中的持续效力,并且能够且应该导致重新审视“巴克曼案”在涉及欺诈食品药品监督管理局等情况的密歇根州原告针对药品制造商的传统产品责任索赔中的适用。下次考虑这一适用时,法院应允许原告提出倾向于证明欺诈食品药品监督管理局的证据,以反驳制造商根据密歇根州豁免法规享有的推定豁免权。