Sterelny Kim
School of Philosophy, Australian National University, Coombs Building, Fellows Road, Acton, Canberra, 0200 ACT, Australia
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2016 Mar 19;371(1690). doi: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0196.
This paper suggests (i) that while work on animal innovation has made good progress in understanding some of the proximate mechanisms and selective regimes through which innovation emerges, it has somewhat neglected the role of the social environment of innovation; a neglect manifest in the fact that innovation counts are almost always counts of resource-acquisition innovations; the invention of social tools is rarely considered. The same is true of many experimental projects, as these typically impose food acquisition tasks on their experimental subjects. (ii) That neglect is important, because innovations often pose collective action problems; the hominin species were technically innovative because they were also socially adaptable. (iii) In part for this reason, there remains a disconnect between research on hominin innovation and research on animal innovation. (iv) Finally, the paper suggests that there is something of a disconnect between the theoretical work on innovation in hominin evolution (based on theories of cultural evolution) and the experimental tradition on human innovation. That disconnect is largely due to the theoretical work retreating from strong claims about the proximate mechanisms of human cultural accumulation.
(i)虽然关于动物创新的研究在理解创新出现的一些近端机制和选择机制方面取得了良好进展,但它在一定程度上忽视了创新的社会环境的作用;这种忽视体现在创新计数几乎总是资源获取创新的计数这一事实上;社会工具的发明很少被考虑。许多实验项目也是如此,因为这些项目通常将食物获取任务强加给实验对象。(ii)这种忽视很重要,因为创新往往会引发集体行动问题;人科物种在技术上具有创新性,因为它们在社会上也具有适应性。(iii)部分出于这个原因,人科创新研究与动物创新研究之间仍然存在脱节。(iv)最后,本文表明,在人科进化中创新的理论研究(基于文化进化理论)与人类创新的实验传统之间存在某种脱节。这种脱节很大程度上是由于理论研究放弃了关于人类文化积累近端机制的有力主张。