Goldman Stephen A
Stephen A. Goldman Consulting Services, L.L.C., Morris Plains, NJ, 07950, USA.
Drug Saf. 2016 Oct;39(10):895-901. doi: 10.1007/s40264-016-0442-9.
Since 1993, how to assess the causality of serious adverse events in premarketing drug clinical trials has undergone sustained regulatory evolution in the USA. In that year, an investigational drug study for chronic hepatitis B virus infection was emergently stopped after a patient suddenly exhibited hepatic failure and lactic acidosis, which later developed, along with pancreatitis and peripheral neuropathy, in several others after drug discontinuation. Five patients eventually died, including three despite emergency liver transplantation. The drug's multisystem toxicity was not predicted by preclinical animal studies, with grave injury to human mitochondria subsequently implicated. A concerned US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) created a task force whose findings would have a lasting impact on the agency's thinking. In 1994, the FDA proposed to amend its investigational new drug reporting requirements largely based on task force recommendations for ways to enhance the likelihood that sponsors and investigators would consider investigational agents as a possible cause of serious adverse events mimicking the underlying disease or concomitant drug toxicity. Then, in its 1997 final rule for expedited safety reporting requirements for drugs and biologics, the FDA advised sponsors that such reporting of serious, unexpected clinical trial cases would be expected when "there is a reasonable suspected causal relationship between the investigational product and the adverse event (i.e., the causal relationship cannot be ruled out)." This last clause was codified into the suspected adverse drug reaction definition in the FDA's 2003 safety reporting requirements for drugs and biologics proposed rule. The negatively received suspected adverse drug reaction and proposed causality standard were not adopted in the FDA's 2010 finalized investigational new drug safety reporting regulations, the agency stating that "'reasonable possibility' means there is evidence to suggest a causal relationship between the drug and the adverse event." However, such new requirements as aggregate analysis of specific events and expedited reporting of animal or in vitro data suggesting significant harm to humans, and subsequent guidance that sponsors develop "a systematic approach" to premarketing safety assessment, are among the components of the FDA's efforts to enhance determination of a "reasonable possibility" of causality. They are also philosophically consistent with the 1993 task force recommendations, and a reminder of the inherent hazards associated with the use of investigational drugs, particularly in the early stages of human study.
自1993年以来,美国在上市前药物临床试验中评估严重不良事件因果关系的方法经历了持续的监管演变。同年,一项针对慢性乙型肝炎病毒感染的研究性药物试验在一名患者突然出现肝衰竭和乳酸性酸中毒后紧急停止,停药后其他几名患者也出现了这种情况,随后还出现了胰腺炎和周围神经病变。最终有5名患者死亡,其中3名患者尽管接受了紧急肝移植仍未能挽救生命。临床前动物研究并未预测到该药物的多系统毒性,随后发现其对人类线粒体造成了严重损伤。忧心忡忡的美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA)成立了一个特别工作组,其调查结果对该机构的理念产生了持久影响。1994年,FDA提议修订其研究性新药报告要求,主要依据特别工作组的建议,以提高申办者和研究者将研究药物视为模仿潜在疾病或伴随药物毒性的严重不良事件可能原因的可能性。然后,在1997年关于药物和生物制品快速安全报告要求的最终规定中,FDA建议申办者,当“研究产品与不良事件之间存在合理的疑似因果关系(即不能排除因果关系)”时,应报告此类严重、意外的临床试验病例。最后这一条款被编入了FDA 2003年关于药物和生物制品安全报告要求的拟议规则中的疑似药品不良反应定义。FDA 2010年最终确定的研究性新药安全报告法规未采用负面评价的疑似药品不良反应和拟议的因果关系标准,该机构表示,“‘合理可能性’是指有证据表明药物与不良事件之间存在因果关系”。然而,诸如对特定事件进行汇总分析以及快速报告表明对人类有重大危害的动物或体外数据等新要求,以及随后指导申办者制定上市前安全评估“系统方法”等内容,都是FDA为提高确定因果关系“合理可能性”所做努力的组成部分。它们在理念上也与1993年特别工作组的建议一致,同时也提醒人们使用研究性药物存在内在风险,尤其是在人体研究的早期阶段。