Matey Jennifer
Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University.
Top Cogn Sci. 2017 Jan;9(1):241-254. doi: 10.1111/tops.12223. Epub 2016 Oct 31.
Phenomenal intentionality is a view about the representational content of conscious experiences that grounds the content of experiences in their phenomenal character. The view is motivated by evidence from introspection, as well as theoretical considerations and intuitions. This paper discusses one potential problem with the view. The view has difficulty accounting for the intentionality of color experiences. Versions of the view either fail to count things as part of the content of color experience that should be counted, resulting in verdicts that some color experiences are inaccurate which should not be, or they admit properties as part of their contents that ought not to be admitted, resulting in color experiences being considered to be accurate when they ought not to be considered so. This is a problem because color predicates are usefully employed in sciences such as biology, cognitive science, and engineering. They are used in generalizations that take the form of laws governing the presence and behavior of properties. Scientific practice relies on the assumption that the laws governing how entities behave employ terms that refer to actual properties that entities really have. We should therefore assume that there is some consistent set of properties to which our color terms refer.
现象意向性是一种关于有意识体验的表征内容的观点，它将体验的内容基于其现象特征。该观点受到内省证据以及理论思考和直觉的推动。本文讨论了该观点的一个潜在问题。该观点在解释颜色体验的意向性方面存在困难。该观点的不同版本要么未能将应被算作颜色体验内容一部分的事物算作内容，从而得出一些颜色体验不准确的结论，而这些体验本不应被认为不准确；要么将不应被接纳的属性接纳为其内容的一部分，从而导致颜色体验在不应被认为准确时却被认为是准确的。这是一个问题，因为颜色谓词在生物学、认知科学和工程学等科学中得到了有效应用。它们被用于以支配属性的存在和行为的规律形式出现的概括中。科学实践依赖于这样一种假设，即支配实体行为的规律所使用的术语指的是实体真正具有的实际属性。因此，我们应该假设存在一组我们的颜色术语所指的一致的属性。
