Anandakumar T, Connaughton E, Coltheart M, Langdon R
Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia; Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia; ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, NSW 2109, Australia.
Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia; ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, NSW 2109, Australia.
J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry. 2017 Sep;56:71-78. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2017.02.005. Epub 2017 Mar 18.
It has been proposed that people with delusions have difficulty inhibiting beliefs (i.e., "doxastic inhibition") so as to reason about them as if they might not be true. We used a continuity approach to test this proposal in non-clinical adults scoring high and low in psychometrically assessed delusion-proneness. High delusion-prone individuals were expected to show greater difficulty than low delusion-prone individuals on "conflict" items of a "belief-bias" reasoning task (i.e. when required to reason logically about statements that conflicted with reality), but not on "non-conflict" items.
Twenty high delusion-prone and twenty low delusion-prone participants (according to the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory) completed a belief-bias reasoning task and tests of IQ, working memory and general inhibition (Excluded Letter Fluency, Stroop and Hayling Sentence Completion).
High delusion-prone individuals showed greater difficulty than low delusion-prone individuals on the Stroop and Excluded Letter Fluency tests of inhibition, but no greater difficulty on the conflict versus non-conflict items of the belief-bias task. They did, however, make significantly more errors overall on the belief-bias task, despite controlling for IQ, working memory and general inhibitory control.
The study had a relatively small sample size and used non-clinical participants to test a theory of cognitive processing in individuals with clinically diagnosed delusions.
Results failed to support a role for doxastic inhibitory failure in non-clinical delusion-prone individuals. These individuals did, however, show difficulty with conditional reasoning about statements that may or may not conflict with reality, independent of any general cognitive or inhibitory deficits.
有人提出，患有妄想症的人在抑制信念（即“信念抑制”）方面存在困难，以至于无法将其视为可能不真实的情况进行推理。我们采用连续性方法，对心理测量评估的妄想倾向得分高和低的非临床成年人进行测试，以验证这一观点。预计高妄想倾向个体在“信念偏差”推理任务的“冲突”项目上（即当需要对与现实冲突的陈述进行逻辑推理时）比低妄想倾向个体表现出更大的困难，但在“非冲突”项目上则不然。
20名高妄想倾向参与者和20名低妄想倾向参与者（根据彼得斯等人的妄想量表）完成了信念偏差推理任务以及智商、工作记忆和一般抑制能力测试（排除字母流畅性测试、斯特鲁普测试和海林句子完成测试）。
在斯特鲁普测试和排除字母流畅性抑制测试中，高妄想倾向个体比低妄想倾向个体表现出更大的困难，但在信念偏差任务的冲突与非冲突项目上没有更大的困难。然而，尽管对智商、工作记忆和一般抑制控制进行了控制，他们在信念偏差任务上总体上仍犯了明显更多的错误。
该研究样本量相对较小，且使用非临床参与者来测试临床诊断为妄想症个体的认知加工理论。
结果未能支持信念抑制失败在非临床妄想倾向个体中的作用。然而，这些个体在对可能与现实冲突或不冲突的陈述进行条件推理时确实存在困难，且与任何一般认知或抑制缺陷无关。
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