Rutgers University, Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, 671 Hoes Lane West, Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA; Rutgers University, Center for Cognitive Science, 152 Frelinghuysen Road, Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA; Rutgers University, University Behavioral Health Care, 671 Hoes Lane West, Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA.
Cognition. 2018 May;174:1-18. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.01.008. Epub 2018 Feb 3.
In his monograph Modularity of Mind (1983), philosopher Jerry Fodor argued that mental architecture can be partly decomposed into computational organs termed modules, which were characterized as having nine co-occurring features such as automaticity, domain specificity, and informational encapsulation. Do modules exist? Debates thus far have been framed very generally with few, if any, detailed case studies. The topic is important because it has direct implications on current debates in cognitive science and because it potentially provides a viable framework from which to further understand and make hypotheses about the mind's structure and function. Here, the case is made for the modularity of contour interpolation, which is a perceptual process that represents non-visible edges on the basis of how surrounding visible edges are spatiotemporally configured. There is substantial evidence that interpolation is domain specific, mandatory, fast, and developmentally well-sequenced; that it produces representationally impoverished outputs; that it relies upon a relatively fixed neural architecture that can be selectively impaired; that it is encapsulated from belief and expectation; and that its inner workings cannot be fathomed through conscious introspection. Upon differentiating contour interpolation from a higher-order contour representational ability ("contour abstraction") and upon accommodating seemingly inconsistent experimental results, it is argued that interpolation is modular to the extent that the initiating conditions for interpolation are strong. As interpolated contours become more salient, the modularity features emerge. The empirical data, taken as a whole, show that at least certain parts of the mind are modularly organized.
在他的专著《心智的模块化》（1983 年）中，哲学家杰里·福多尔（Jerry Fodor）认为心智结构可以部分分解为称为模块的计算器官，这些模块具有九个共同特征，如自动性、领域特异性和信息封装。模块存在吗？迄今为止的争论框架非常笼统，很少有（如果有的话）详细的案例研究。这个话题很重要，因为它对认知科学领域当前的争论有直接影响，并且因为它可能为进一步理解和对心智结构和功能提出假设提供了可行的框架。在这里，我们提出了轮廓插值的模块性的案例，这是一种基于周围可见边缘的时空配置来表示不可见边缘的感知过程。有大量证据表明插值是领域特异性的、强制性的、快速的，并且在发展上是有序的；它产生表现上贫乏的输出；它依赖于相对固定的神经结构，可以选择性地受损；它不受信念和期望的影响；其内部运作无法通过有意识的内省来理解。在将轮廓插值与更高阶的轮廓表示能力（“轮廓抽象”）区分开来，并适应看似不一致的实验结果之后，可以认为，只要插值的起始条件足够强，插值就是模块化的。随着插值轮廓变得更加突出，模块化特征就会显现出来。总的来说，这些经验数据表明，心智的某些部分至少是模块化组织的。
