Cavaliere Giulia
Department of Global Health and Social Medicine, School of Global Affairs, King's College London, Room 3.12, Bush House (NE), 30, Aldwych, London, WC2B 4BG, UK.
Monash Bioeth Rev. 2018 Dec;36(1-4):1-22. doi: 10.1007/s40592-018-0086-x.
Eugenics is often referred to in debates on the ethics of reproductive technologies and practices, in relation to the creation of moral boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable technologies, and acceptable and unacceptable uses of these technologies. Historians have argued that twentieth century eugenics cannot be reduced to a uniform set of practices, and that no simple lessons can be drawn from this complex history. Some authors stress the similarities between past eugenics and present reproductive technologies and practices (what I define throughout the paper as 'the continuity view') in order to condemn the latter. Others focus on the differences between past and present practices (what I define throughout the paper as 'the discontinuity view') in order to defend contemporary reproductive technologies. In this paper, I explore the meanings of the word 'eugenics' and the relationship between its past and present uses in terms of contemporary debates on reproductive technologies and practices. I argue that moral disagreement about present technologies originate in divergent views of condemnable and justifiable features of the past.
在关于生殖技术及实践伦理的辩论中，优生学常常被提及，涉及到在可接受与不可接受的技术之间，以及这些技术的可接受与不可接受的用途之间划定道德界限。历史学家认为，二十世纪的优生学不能简化为一套统一的实践，而且无法从这段复杂的历史中得出简单的教训。一些作者强调过去的优生学与当前生殖技术及实践之间的相似性（在本文中我将其定义为“连续性观点”），以便谴责后者。另一些人则关注过去与当前实践之间的差异（在本文中我将其定义为“非连续性观点”），以捍卫当代生殖技术。在本文中，我根据当代关于生殖技术及实践的辩论，探讨“优生学”一词的含义及其过去和现在用法之间的关系。我认为，关于当前技术的道德分歧源于对过去应受谴责和合理特征的不同看法。
