Department of Biomedicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Porto, Al. Prof. Hernâni Monteiro, 4200 - 319 Porto, Portugal.
Rev Neurosci. 2019 Nov 26;30(8):881-888. doi: 10.1515/revneuro-2019-0006.
Every scientific practice rests on implicit unrevised theoretical assumptions. Neuroscience, in particular, focuses on a very controversial object of study-the brain and is therefore prone to tacitly embrace philosophical positions in its everyday workings. It is thus, of utmost importance, to develop a critique of the structure of neuroscientific investigation so as to understand what the uncovered pillars of the field are, what pitfalls they may implicate and how we can correct them. In this paper, I gather the first critiques in animal cognitive neuroscience and hope to establish the first step in a continuous process of revision. By applying a conceptual division of neuroscience into cognitive, behavioral and neurobiological theories, I point out the main problems in articulating the three, based on actual scientific practice rather than purely theoretical reasoning. I conclude by proposing developments on behavioral theory and set an initial critique on assumptions on both cognitive and neurobiological theories.
每一种科学实践都建立在隐含的未修正的理论假设之上。神经科学，特别是，专注于一个非常有争议的研究对象——大脑，因此在其日常工作中很容易默认接受哲学立场。因此，开发一种对神经科学研究结构的批判，以了解该领域未被揭示的支柱是什么，它们可能带来的陷阱是什么，以及我们如何纠正它们，是非常重要的。在本文中，我收集了动物认知神经科学中的第一批批评意见，并希望为一个持续的修正过程奠定第一步。通过将神经科学分为认知、行为和神经生物学理论，我根据实际的科学实践而不是纯粹的理论推理，指出了这三个理论之间进行阐述的主要问题。最后，我提出了行为理论的发展，并对认知和神经生物学理论的假设进行了初步批评。
