Ronin Institute for Independent Scholarship, Montclair, New Jersey, USA
J Med Ethics. 2020 Mar;46(3):188-193. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105592. Epub 2019 Sep 5.
I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of 'parental responsibility' whereas the fetus is not. 'Parental responsibilities' are a moral dimension of a 'parent-child relation', a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analysing the concepts of 'parent' and 'child', and conclude that the difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns means one may claim abortion is morally permissible while also claiming infanticide is not morally permissible, without inconsistency between the two claims.
我为胎儿和新生儿之间在道德地位上的差异辩护,这种差异体现在,新生儿是“父母责任”的恰当对象,而胎儿则不是。“父母责任”是“亲子关系”的一个道德维度,新生儿具有这种关系,而胎儿则没有。我通过分析“父母”和“孩子”的概念来为这种关系辩护,并得出结论,即胎儿和新生儿在道德地位上的差异意味着,一个人可以声称堕胎在道德上是允许的,同时又声称杀婴在道德上是不允许的,而这两个主张之间不会存在不一致。