Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Den Haag, The Netherlands.
Health Econ. 2021 Apr;30(4):803-819. doi: 10.1002/hec.4222. Epub 2021 Jan 27.
In the Dutch health care system of managed competition, insurers and mental health providers negotiate on prices for mental health services. Contract prices are capped by a regulator who sets a maximum price for each mental health service. In 2013, the majority of the contract prices equaled these maximum prices. We study price setting after a major policy change in 2014. In 2014, mental health care providers had to negotiate prices with each individual health insurer separately, instead of with all insurers collectively as in 2013. Moreover, after a cost-price revision, the regulator increased in 2014 maximum prices by about 10%. Insurers and mental health providers reacted to this policy change by setting most contract prices below the new maximum prices. We find that in 2014 mental health providers with more market power, that is, a higher willingness-to-pay measure, contracted significantly higher prices. Some insurers negotiated significantly lower prices than other insurers but these differences are unrelated to an insurers' market share.
在荷兰的管理竞争型医疗保健体系中,保险公司和精神卫生服务提供者就精神卫生服务的价格进行谈判。合同价格由监管机构设定上限,监管机构为每项精神卫生服务设定最高价格。在 2013 年,大多数合同价格等于这些最高价格。我们在 2014 年的一项重大政策变化后研究价格制定情况。2014 年,精神卫生服务提供者必须与每个单独的健康保险公司协商价格,而不是像 2013 年那样与所有保险公司集体协商。此外,在成本价格修订后,监管机构在 2014 年将最高价格提高了约 10%。保险公司和精神卫生服务提供者对这一政策变化做出了反应,将大多数合同价格定在新的最高价格以下。我们发现,2014 年,市场影响力较大(即支付意愿衡量指标较高)的精神卫生服务提供者签订的合同价格要高得多。一些保险公司的谈判价格明显低于其他保险公司,但这些差异与保险公司的市场份额无关。