Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States; Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, MIT, United States.
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT, United States; Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, MIT, United States.
Cognition. 2021 Dec;217:104890. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104890. Epub 2021 Sep 3.
When holding others morally responsible, we care about what they did, and what they thought. Traditionally, research in moral psychology has relied on vignette studies, in which a protagonist's actions and thoughts are explicitly communicated. While this research has revealed what variables are important for moral judgment, such as actions and intentions, it is limited in providing a more detailed understanding of exactly how these variables affect moral judgment. Using dynamic visual stimuli that allow for a more fine-grained experimental control, recent studies have proposed a direct mapping from visual features to moral judgments. We embrace the use of visual stimuli in moral psychology, but question the plausibility of a feature-based theory of moral judgment. We propose that the connection from visual features to moral judgments is mediated by an inference about what the observed action reveals about the agent's mental states, and what causal role the agent's action played in bringing about the outcome. We present a computational model that formalizes moral judgments of agents in visual scenes as computations over an intuitive theory of physics combined with an intuitive theory of mind. We test the model's quantitative predictions in three experiments across a wide variety of dynamic interactions.
当我们对他人进行道德评判时，我们关心的是他们的所作所为和所思所想。传统上，道德心理学的研究依赖于情境研究，其中明确传达了主角的行为和思想。虽然这项研究揭示了哪些变量对道德判断很重要，例如行为和意图，但它在提供对这些变量如何影响道德判断的更详细理解方面存在局限性。最近的研究使用动态视觉刺激，允许更精细的实验控制，提出了一种从视觉特征到道德判断的直接映射。我们支持在道德心理学中使用视觉刺激，但对基于特征的道德判断理论的合理性提出质疑。我们提出，从视觉特征到道德判断的联系是通过对观察到的行为揭示主体心理状态的推断以及主体行为在导致结果中所起的因果作用来介导的。我们提出了一个计算模型，将视觉场景中主体的道德判断形式化为对物理直觉理论和心智直觉理论的计算。我们通过三个跨越广泛动态交互的实验来检验模型的定量预测。
